On the Malice of Herodotus

1 The style of Herodotus <of Halicarnassus>,[2] my dear Alexander,[3] because it is simple and lacking in effort and easily runs over events, has thoroughly deceived many people. And more people have experienced this with regard to his character.[4] For not only is it, as Plato says, the greatest injustice to appear to be just when one is not,[5] it is also an act of the greatest malice to mimic a good nature and simplicity in a way that is hard to detect. <. . .>[6] he has
854F especially employed against the Boeotians and the Corinthians,[7] nor has he refrained from any of the others, I think it is appropriate for us to come to the defence both of our ancestors and of the truth in this very part of his work – since those who wished to go through in detail all the rest of his falsehoods and fictions would require many volumes. But as Sophocles says, 'the face of Persua-
855A sion is fearsome',[8] especially when, in a narrative that has such great charm and power, it is able to cover up all the other absurdities as well as the character of the historian. Philip used to say to those Greeks who were breaking their alliance with him and going over to Titus that they were putting on a collar that was smoother but would last longer.[9] The malice of Herodotus is smoother, to be sure, and softer than that of Theopompus[10] but it fastens on to its object and causes pain more, like winds that blow in secret through a narrow opening compared with those that are dispersed in the open.

Now it seems preferable to me to make an outline of all those
855B things which are in general the footprints and tokens,[11] as it were, of a narrative that is not honest or well disposed, but malicious, and then to test each one of the matters we shall examine to see whether it fits.

2 To begin, then, one who in narrating events uses the harshest words and expressions when milder ones are available[12] – as if one called Nicias 'superstitious' when one could have said 'too devoted to divination',[13] or one spoke of the 'rashness and madness' of Cleon rather than his 'insubstantial talk'[14] – is not well disposed, but takes delight, as it were, in narrating the event in a clever[15] manner.

Second, if there is something discreditable to a person, but it 3
otherwise has nothing to do with the history, and the historian
grabs hold of it and inserts it into his account of the deeds though 855C
there is no need to, lengthening his narrative and coming back to it, so that he may encompass some misfortune or a deed which is unusual and of no use, he is clearly taking pleasure in abuse. For this reason Thucydides did not delineate Cleon's missteps, although they were innumerable, and merely touching on the demagogue Hyperbolus in one phrase and calling him 'a scoundrel',[16] he let it go. Philistus omitted all Dionysius' injustices against the barbarians that were not integral to Greek affairs.[17] For digressions and
diversions in history are best given over to myths and accounts of 855D
earliest times, or yet again to praise;[18] but the one who makes asides in which he engages in defamation and fault-finding seems to fall into the tragic curse of 'cataloguing the misfortunes of mortals'.[19]

And then there is the opposite of this, evident to everyone, 4
which is the omission of something fine and noble. This may seem to be unobjectionable, but it is malicious if in fact what is left out has a proper place in the history.[20] For praise that is not bestowed readily is no fairer than taking pleasure in blaming: not only is it no fairer, it is perhaps even worse.

I identify the fourth sign of a character that is not well minded 5, 855E
in history as one which, when there are two or more accounts of the same thing, sides with the worse. Sophists are sometimes allowed, either as practice or in their pursuit of renown, to take up and adorn the weaker argument,[21] for they are not trying to establish a firm conviction in their thesis, and they often admit that they fall into paradox when speaking on incredible topics. But the one who writes history behaves justly if he speaks those things he knows to be true, and if, where matters are uncertain, he believes that the better account rather than the worse is spoken truly.[22] Many omit the worse account entirely, as, for example, Ephorus[23] in speaking of Themistocles: he says that Themistocles knew
about Pausanias' treason and the latter's activities with respect to 855F
the King's generals, but Themistocles was not persuaded, he says, nor did he, when Pausanias invited him to share in the plot and urged him on to such rewards, accept the offer. Thucydides, on the other hand, has condemned this story by omitting it entirely.[24]

6 Further, when the facts are agreed upon but the reason they
were done and the intention of those doing them are unclear, the
one who conjectures towards the worse[25] is ill willed and mali-
cious, like the comic poets[26] who portray the war to have been
856A ignited by Pericles on account of Aspasia or Phidias rather than
because of rivalry and a wish to lay low the spirit of the Pelopon-
nesians and make no concession to the Lacedaemonians.[27] Now it
is thoroughly obvious that a writer falls short of no excess of jeal-
ousy and malice if he ascribes a bad reason to deeds that are highly
esteemed and actions that are praised, and thus by means of slan-
der leads the reader into inappropriate suspicions about the
'hidden' intention of the historical actor – all because he cannot
find fault openly with the deed itself. Such are those who suggest
that the murder of the tyrant Alexander by Thebe was not a deed
arising from her high-mindedness and hatred of tyranny but
rather because of some jealousy and womanish emotion;[28] or
856B those who say that Cato committed suicide because he feared a
torturous death at the hands of Caesar.[29]

7 A historical narrative admits of malice if it alters the character
of the deed by claiming that it was accomplished by means of
money rather than through bravery, as some claim of Philip,[30] or
that it was done easily and without effort, as with Alexander;[31] or
if it was done not with forethought but by some good fortune, as
Timotheus' enemies claim about him, painting pictures that
showed the cities themselves crawling into a pot while he slept.[32] It
is clear that those who would take away nobility, great effort,
856C excellence and active effort diminish the greatness and the beauty
of the deeds.

8 Further, those who openly attack their victims are easily accused of peevishness, brazenness or even madness when they are not measured in their speech. But those who attack from the side, hurling their slanders like weapons under cover, as it were, but then come back around and hesitate by claiming that they disbelieve what they very much want their audience to believe – these writers, in seeking to ward off a charge of malice, incur the additional charge of servility.[33]

9 Similar to these are those who place some praise alongside their criticism, for example, Aristoxenus who said of Socrates that he

was uneducated, ignorant and licentious, and then added, 'but
there was no injustice in him'.[34] Just as flatterers sometimes, with a 856D
certain skill and cleverness, mix in some light criticisms with their
many lengthy praises, as if they were introducing frank speech as a
seasoning for their flattery, so maliciousness puts in some praise
beforehand to win credence for the criticisms that follow.[35]

One could enumerate more characteristics, but these will suf- 10
fice to furnish a means for observing the disposition and character
of the man.[36]

First of all, then, as if from his own hearth, he begins with Io, 11
the daughter of Inachus, a woman whom all the Greeks believe to
have been divinized with honours by the barbarians, and who,
because of her renown, gave her name to many seas and to the
most distinguished harbours, and was the source and origin of the 856E
most renowned and most regal families.[37] He says, this excellent
writer, that she handed herself over to Phoenician traders because
she had been seduced willingly by one of the captains and was
afraid that her pregnancy would be revealed.[38] And he falsely
attributes this to the Phoenicians, claiming that this is *their* story
about her.[39] Citing Persian 'learned men' as his witnesses that the
Phoenicians seized Io together with other women, he then imme-
diately reveals his opinion that the fairest and greatest deed of
Greece, the Trojan War, came about through folly on account of a
worthless woman: 'for it is clear', he says, 'that if the women 856F
themselves had not been willing', they would not have been stolen
away.[40] Well then, are we to say that the gods behave foolishly,
since they were angry with the Lacedaemonians for having raped
the daughters of Leuktros, and punished Ajax for his assault on
Cassandra?[41] For it is evident, according to Herodotus, that unless
the women themselves had been willing, they would not have been
outraged. And yet he himself says that Aristomenes was taken
alive by the Lacedaemonians, and later in time the general of the
Achaeans, Philopoemen, experienced this same fate, and the
Carthaginians took Regulus, the Roman general, prisoner – and it 857A
would be a task to find braver fighters than those men![42] But this
is not surprising since men capture alive even leopards and tigers;[43]
yet Herodotus condemns the women who were violated and
defends the men who violated them.

12 He is so pro-barbarian that he absolves Busiris of the charge of
human sacrifice and murder of foreigners, and in bearing witness
to the great piety and justice of the Egyptians he turns this defile-
ment and bloodthirstiness against the Greeks.[44] In the second
book he says that Menelaus, when he had received back Helen
857B from Proteus[45] and had been honoured with great gifts, proved
himself to be the most unjust and wickedest of men: being kept
back by bad weather, he contrived an unholy deed, taking two of
the native children and cutting them up. Finding himself now the
object of hatred because of this act and hunted down, he fled with
his ships and arrived in Libya.[46] I have no idea what Egyptian told
this story: contrary to this, many honours for Helen and many for
Menelaus continue to be observed by the Egyptians.[47]

13 But the historian, continuing the pursuit, says that the Persians
857C learned pederasty from the Greeks.[48] And yet how can the Per-
sians owe their instruction in *this* to the Greeks when it is agreed
by practically everyone that they castrated boys before they had
ever seen the Greek sea?[49] But we are told that the Greeks learned
from the Egyptians how to conduct processions and public festi-
vals and the worship of the twelve gods; that Melampodas learned
the name of Dionysus from the Egyptians and taught it to the rest
of the Greeks; that the mysteries and the secret rites of Demeter
were brought from Egypt by the daughters of Danaus; and that
the Egyptians beat their breasts and mourn but for whom, he says,
he is unwilling to name, 'maintaining a holy silence about reli-
gious matters'.[50] Yet he has displayed no such holy silence at all
857D towards Heracles and Dionysus, whom he shows as being wor-
shipped by the Egyptians, whereas for the Greeks they are mortals
who have grown old.[51] He says further that Heracles is of the
second generation of gods and Dionysus of the third since they
had a point at which they were born and were thus not in exist-
ence from the beginning.[52] But at least he declares the Egyptian
ones to be gods, whereas he thinks it is necessary to offer honour
to the Greek ones as to mortals and heroes but not to offer them
sacrifice as to gods.[53] He has said the same about Pan,[54] overturn-
ing, by means of the boastfulness and mythic tales of the
Egyptians, the most revered and holiest of Greek rites.

857E And this is not the worst. He traces Heracles' ancestry to

Perseus and says that according to the Persian account, Perseus was Assyrian, and thus 'the leaders of the chiefs of the Dorians would be manifestly Egyptians all the way back if we traced their fathers from Danae and Acrisius'.[55] As for Epaphus and Io, Iasos and Argos, he has completely omitted them, being eager to demonstrate not only other Heracleses – Egyptian and Phoenician – but also to drive that Heracles, whom he says belongs to the third generation, from the land of Greece to the barbarians.[56] And yet none of the learned men of old – not Homer, Hesiod, Archilochus, Pei- 857F sander, Stesichorus, Alcman or Pindar – has any account of an Egyptian or Phoenician Heracles but all of them know just one Heracles, the one of Boeotia and Argos alike.[57]

Furthermore, of the Seven Wise Men, whom he calls 'soph- 15 ists',[58] he proclaims that Thales was Phoenician by race and thus originally a barbarian.[59] And slandering the gods in the person of Solon he has him say, 'You ask me – who know that the divine is thoroughly jealous and disruptive – about human affairs.' This is 858A what he himself believed about the gods but he attributed to Solon and thus added malice to blasphemy.[60] He featured Pittacus[61] for small things of no account, yet he passed over the greatest and finest of the man's achievements, although he had occasion to treat the matter.[62] When the Athenians and Mytileneans were fighting over Sigeum, and the general of the Athenians, Phrynon, called for someone to volunteer for single combat, it was Pittacus who took up the challenge, and casting a net around his opponent, who was a strong, tall man, he defeated and killed him. Although the Mytileneans offered him great gifts, he threw his spear and 858B asked only for as much land as was covered by the spearcast. (And to this day the land is called 'Pittaceum'.) And what did Herodotus do when he came to this part of the story? Instead of treating the brave exploits of Pittacus, he mentioned the poet Alcaeus who fled from battle and cast away his weapons.[63] By not treating the fine actions, and by not passing over shameful actions,[64] he bears witness to those who say that jealousy and *schadenfreude* arise from the same vice.

After this he lays a charge of treason against the Alcmaeonids,[65] 16 who proved themselves brave men and freed their country from tyranny, by saying that they received Peisistratus back from 858C

exile and brought him back on condition that he marry the daughter of Megacles. And he says that she said to her mother, 'Do you see, Mummy? Peisistratus does not have intercourse with me in the normal way.' And he says it was because the Alcmaeonids were indignant at this transgression that they drove out the tyrant.[66]

17 In order that the Lacedaemonians should not experience less of
his malice than the Athenians, look at how shamefully he has
treated Othryadas, a man who was especially admired and hon-
oured by them. He says, 'But the one survivor of the 300, being
858D ashamed to return to Sparta when the men of his regiment had all
perished, did away with himself there on the spot in Thyrea.' Ear-
lier he says that both sides disputed the victory but here he claims
the shame of Othryadas as evidence of the defeat of the Lacedae-
monians, since to go on living when defeated would be shameful,
while to be victorious and survive would be most glorious.[67]

18 I shall pass over the fact that he portrays Croesus as an utterly
ignorant, comical braggart, but then says that when he became a
prisoner he instructed and admonished Cyrus – Cyrus who has
the reputation of having been first amongst kings in intelligence,
bravery and greatness of mind.[68] For Croesus he offers no evi-
858E dence of his doing any good thing other than honouring the gods
with many grand dedications – but he indicates that this very
thing was the most impious action of all: he says that Croesus'
brother, Pantaleon, while their father was still living, contended
with him for the throne, and that when Croesus became king, he
killed a nobleman who was one of Pantaleon's companions and
friends by having him flayed on a carding comb; and it was from
this man's possessions that he made dedications and sent them off
to the gods.[69] As for Deioces the Mede, who acquired his rule by
virtue and justice, he says that he was not like this by nature, but
858F rather made a pretence of justice because he was enamoured of
tyranny.[70]

19 But I can dispense with the barbarians, since there is no lack of examples in his treatment of Greeks. He says that the Athenians and most of the Ionians are ashamed of the name 'Ionian' and do not wish to be called by this name but rather shun it; and further, that those men who considered themselves most noble and had set out from the council house of Athens had children by barbarian

women after they had killed these women's fathers, husbands and
children; and it was for this, he says, that the women established
the custom, by swearing oaths and handing it down to their
daughters, never to eat at table with their husbands or to address
their husbands by name; and the Milesians of today are descended
from these women. He adds that the pure Ionians are those who 859A
celebrate the Apatouria festival, 'and all', he says, 'do this except
the Ephesians and the Colophonians': in this way he has denied
these people their noble birth.[71]

He says that when Pactyes revolted from Cyrus,[72] the Cymaeans 20
<. . .> and the Mytileneans were preparing to hand the man over
'for a certain price, though I cannot say exactly how much': well
done this, to claim ignorance of what the amount was and yet to
cast such a reproach against a Greek city, as if he knew clearly. He
then says that the Chians, when Pactyas was brought to them,
removed him from the temple of Athena the City-Guardian and 859B
handed him over, and when they had done this they received
Atarneus as their reward. Yet Charon of Lampsacus, an older
writer, when he comes to treat Pactyes, has attributed no such pollution to the Mytileneans or the Chians. Here are his actual
words: 'When Pactyas realized that a Persian army was marching
against him, he took flight and went first to Mytilene and then
Chios. And Cyrus got hold of him.'[73]

In his third book when he treats the Lacedaemonians' expedition against the tyrant Polycrates,[74] he says that the Samians believe 21
and declare that the Lacedaemonians made an expedition to Samos 859C
to restore those citizens in exile and make war against the tyrant
in gratitude to them for their assistance with Messene.[75] He then
says that the Lacedaemonians deny this reason, saying instead
that they made the expedition not to help out or to liberate the
Samians but to take vengeance against them: for the Samians had
stolen a mixing bowl that the Lacedaemonians were sending to
Croesus and a linen corselet that was being sent back to the Lacedaemonians from Amasis.[76] And yet we know no city of that time
that was more desirous of honour or more hating of tyrants than
that of the Lacedaemonians. For what sort of corselet or mixing
bowl did they drive out the Cypselids from Ambracia, Lygdamis 859D
from Naxos, the sons of Peisistratus from Athens, Aeschines from

Sicyon, Symmachus from Thasos, Aulis from Phocaea, Aris-
togenes from Miletus, and destroy the dynasty of Thessaly by
doing away with Aristomedes and Agelaos through King Leo-
tychidas? These actions have been written about in more detail
elsewhere.[77] But according to Herodotus, the Lacedaemonians fell
short of no excess of wickedness or stupidity if they denied the
fairest and most just explanation for their expedition and instead
859E agreed that they had attacked men who were unfortunate and in
misery, on account of their vindictiveness and pettiness.

22 Still, he painted the Lacedaemonians in dark colours because
they, in some way or other, fell under the purview of his writing.
But to Corinth, which was outside his path in this matter, he
nevertheless made a detour, so to speak, and infected them with a
terrible charge and a most knavish slander. He says that the Cor-
inthians eagerly took part in the expedition against Samos because
the Samians had previously committed an outrage against them as
follows: Periander, the tyrant of Corinth, was sending 300 boys of
859F the nobility to Alyattes to be castrated.[78] When they arrived at
Samos, the Samians instructed them to sit as suppliants in the
temple of Artemis, and they brought them each day cakes of honey
and sesame and thereby saved them. This is the 'outrage' of the
Samians against the Corinthians claimed by our historian and it
was on account of this, he says, that the Corinthians urged on the
Lacedaemonians many years later, because the Samians had ensured
that 300 Greek boys should grow up to be men. In attributing this
reproachful act to the Corinthians he makes the city more wicked
than the tyrant. For Polycrates at least protected his own son when
the Corcyraeans were trying to destroy him. But what outrage did
860A the Corinthians suffer that they wished vengeance on the Samians
who had stood in the way of such savagery and lawlessness – and
why would they do these things three generations later, showing
anger and vindictiveness on behalf of a tyranny that, when it was
finally destroyed, they expended every effort to wipe out and erase
every memory and trace of, because it had been so harsh and bur-
densome to them?

But let us suppose that this was the Samian outrage against the
Corinthians: what then was the punishment of the Corinthians
against the Samians? If in fact they had been angry with the

Samians, it would have been more appropriate for them not to
encourage but to discourage a Lacedaemonian campaign against
Polycrates, for then the tyranny would not be destroyed, and the
Samians would not become free men nor cease to be slaves. And 860B
here is the greatest problem: why in the world were the Corinth-
ians angry with the Samians who wanted to save the boys but
could not, while laying no charge against the Cnidians who did
save them and sent them home? As it is, the Corcyraeans take little
account of the Samians but they remember the Cnidians and have
awarded them honours, special privileges and decrees of recogni-
tion. For the Cnidians sailed out and drove Periander's guards
from the temple and they themselves took up the boys and escorted
them back to Corcyra,[79] as Antenor has recorded in his *Cretan
Affairs* and Dionysius of Chalcis in his *Foundations*.[80] And one 860C
can use the Samians themselves as witnesses that the Lacedaemon-
ians did not make their expedition to take vengeance on the
Samians but rather to free them from the tyrant and save them.
For they say there is a tomb in Samos, made at public expense for
Archias, a Spartiate, who fought brilliantly there and died; and he
is honoured by the Samians; and even Herodotus testifies to this
at least: that the man's descendants continue to this day to have
close ties of friendship with the Samians.[81]

In the fifth book he says that Cleisthenes, a man of the nobility 23
and the highest rank, succeeding in persuading the priestess at
Delphi to become a false prophet by continually enjoining the 860D
Lacedaemonians to free Athens from the tyrants. In so doing he
attaches to this noblest and most just deed the slander of great
impiety and fraud while at the same time taking away from the
god a prophecy that was fair and noble and worthy of Themis
who is said to share in these prophecies.[82] He says that Isagoras
went along with Cleomenes' visits to his wife, and, as is his cus-
tom, he mingles some praises with his criticisms to win trust for
his account.[83] 'Isagoras,' he says, 'was of a distinguished home but
I cannot say whence it originated; but his relatives sacrifice to Car- 860E
ian Zeus.' The writer's sneer is graceful and civil, escorting
Isagoras away to the Carians as if to perdition.[84] Aristogeiton,
however, he attacks not from behind or from the side, but head on
and he drives him through the gates to Phoenicia, saying that he is

by origin a Gephyraean; and the Gephyraeans, he says, are not from Euboea or Eretria, as some think, but Phoenicians, he himself having learned this by inquiry.[85]

Furthermore, he cannot take away from the Lacedaemonians
their liberation of Athens from the tyrants, but he is able to dimin-
ish and dishonour this most noble deed by attributing a most
860F shameful reaction: for he says that the Lacedaemonians quickly
changed their minds, believing they had not acted rightly because
they had been led astray by counterfeit oracles, and had driven out
from their homeland the tyrants – men who were friendly to them
and had promised to make Athens subservient to them – and had
handed the city over to the ungrateful commons. Sending there-
upon for Hippias from Sigeum, they were going to restore him to
Athens.[86] But the Corinthians opposed them and dissuaded them,
Socles going through all those things that Cypselus and Periander
861A had done against the city when they held the tyranny.[87] No wicked-
er or more savage action is recorded of Periander, however, than
the dispatch of those 300 young men; and yet when the Samians
seized them and tried to prevent them from suffering this fate, he
says the Corinthians were angry and vengeful as if they had been
outraged. With such confusion and contradiction does his malice
fill his account, sneaking into his account on any pretext.[88]

24 In the account of Sardis that follows, he did everything he
could to do away with and despoil the deed.[89] He dares to call the
ships which the Athenians sent to the Ionians to assist them in
their revolt from the king 'the beginning of evils' because they
861B tried to free so many and such great cities from the king.[90] And
remembering the Eretrians only in an aside, he is completely silent
about their great and renowned success.[91] For when there was
confusion around Ionia and a royal force was sailing against them,
the Eretrians went to meet the Cypriots outside, in the Pamphylian
sea, and fought a naval battle against them. Then turning back and
leaving their ships at Ephesus, they attacked Sardis and besieged
Artaphernes who had taken refuge in the citadel, trying thereby to
861C raise the siege of Miletus.[92] They accomplished this and they
caused the enemy to withdraw in astonished fear. And when they
were then attacked by a great force, they retreated. Others have
spoken of this, especially Lysanias of Mallus in his *On Eretria*.[93]

And it would have been a fine thing to have noted this brave deed
and display of prowess if for no other reason than at least to mark
the capture and destruction of the city. But he says that they were
in fact defeated by the barbarians and driven back to their ships,
although Charon of Lampsacus records no such thing, but writes
exactly as follows: 'The Athenians sailed with twenty triremes
intending to bring help to the Ionians, and they marched against
Sardis and captured everything except the royal wall. And having 861D
accomplished these things, they withdrew to Miletus.'[94]

In the sixth book he treats the Plataeans: when they tried to 25
entrust themselves to the Spartiates, the latter bid them instead to
turn to the Athenians since they were their neighbours and could
offer no small assistance, but then he adds, not as a suspicion or
what was believed but as if knowing accurately, that 'the Lacedae-
monians suggested this not so much from goodwill towards the
Athenians as from wishing rather to cause trouble to the Athen-
ians who would thereby be at odds with the Boeotians.'[95] So then
if Herodotus is not being malicious, the Lacedaemonians were
plotters and malicious ones at that, the Athenians failed to per- 861E
ceive they were being deceived, and the Plataeans were cast into
the middle not because of goodwill or honour but as a pretext
for war.[96]

And further he has already been clearly convicted of making 26
false accusations against the Lacedaemonians in the matter of the
full moon:[97] he says that they were awaiting this and that was why
they did not bring help to the Athenians at Marathon.[98] But not
only have they made countless expeditions and battles when the
moon was full, but even this battle, which occurred on sixth
Boedromion, they only just missed, such that they in fact could
see the corpses when they arrived at this place.[99] And yet he has 861F
written about the full moon as follows: 'It was impossible for
them to do this immediately because they were unwilling to break
their law. For it was the ninth day early in the month and they said
that they could not march out on the ninth since the moon was not
full. They, then, were awaiting the full moon.'[100] But you are mov-
ing the full moon from the middle to the beginning of the month,
and you are confounding the heavens and the calendar and every-
thing![101] And having announced that you were writing up the

affairs of Hellas <so that they might not be lacking in glory>[102]
862A and although you are especially keen on Athens, you have not
recorded the procession to Agras which they send still to this day
on the sixth of the month as a thankoffering. But this at least sup-
ports Herodotus against that slander that he received a lot of
money from Athens for flattering them. For if he had read out
these things to the Athenians they would not have allowed it, nor
would they have tolerated an account where Philippides sum-
moned the Lacedaemonians to the battle on the ninth – when he
had just come from the battle[103] – and arrived at Sparta the day
862B after, as Herodotus himself says, unless the Athenians sent for
their allies after having defeated the enemy. It is Diyllus, not a neg-
ligible historian, who records that Herodotus received from
Athens, on the motion of Anytus, a gift of ten talents.[104] And when
he reports the battle, Herodotus has, as the majority say,[105] ruined
the deed by the number he records of the corpses. For they say that
the Athenians had vowed to Artemis Agrotera one goat for every
barbarian killed, but then, after the battle, when it became clear
that the number of corpses could not be counted, they passed a
862C decree asking the goddess to accept their sacrifice each year of 500
goats.[106]

27 Even so, we shall let this pass and look at what happens after the battle:

> With their remaining ships the barbarians set sail and taking up from the island the slaves from Eretria that they had left behind, they sailed around Sunium, wishing to arrive in the city before the Athenians. And there was a charge current among the Athenians that the Persians were minded to do this from a contrivance of the Alcmaeonids, for the latter had made an agreement with the Persians and flashed a shield for them when they were already on their ships. These, then, were sailing around Sunium.[107]

Let us dismiss his calling of the Eretrians 'slaves', even though
they displayed a daring and eagerness for renown inferior to none
862D of the Greeks, and suffered things unworthy of their courage.[108]
His slander of the Alcmaeonids who boasted the greatest families
and the most distinguished men is also of little import. And the

greatness of the victory has been ruined and the end of this celebrated success has come to nothing: there seems to have been no struggle or accomplishment of any great sort but a brief skirmish[109] with the barbarians as they were landing (just as those disparaging and envious writers say)[110] if, after the battle, the Persians do not flee, cutting the cables of their ships, giving themselves 862E over to the wind which carries them far away from Attica, but instead a shield, a sign of treason, is raised for them as they sail for Athens expecting to capture it, and when they have sailed around Sunium they lie off Phalerum, while the first and most renowned of men in desperation betray the city.[111] For although later he exonerates the Alcmaeonids, he assigns the treason to others: 'For a shield was flashed, and this cannot be denied', he says, as if he himself had seen it![112] Yet this was impossible if the Athenians had won a decisive victory. And if it had been given, it could not have been seen by the barbarians for they were being driven to their 862F ships in flight and with much trouble from wounds and missiles, each man leaving the land as fast as he could. But when later Herodotus pretends to be defending the Alcmaeonids from charges which he was the very first one to make and says, 'It is a wonder to me, and I do not accept the story that the Alcmaeonids would ever have by agreement shown a shield to the Persians because they wanted the Athenians to be under the power of Hippias', I am reminded of a piece of verse: 'Wait, little crab, and I shall release you.'[113] Why are you so keen to capture something if once captured you intend to let it go? And you accuse, then defend? 863A And you compose slanders against pre-eminent men, which you then take back, clearly distancing yourself.[114] For you have yourself saying that the Alcmaeonids raised a shield to the barbarians who had been conquered and were in flight. And further, where you defend the Alcmaeonids, there you reveal yourself to be an inventor of false charges. For if it's true, as you write here, that 'they are manifestly as much or more hostile to tyrants than Callias, the son of Phaenippus and father of Hipponicus', where will you put that alliance of theirs which you wrote about in your first book, when they led Peisistratus back from exile to the tyranny at Athens so as to make a marriage connection with him, and they would not have driven him out again until he was accused of 863B

having abnormal intercourse with his wife?[115] Such, then, are the contradictions in these accounts. And amidst the slander and suspicion cast upon the Alcmaeonids he employs praise for Callias, the son of Phaenippus, and he adds his son Hipponicus, who was one of the wealthiest men in Herodotus' time, and in doing so reveals that although these details were irrelevant to the story he inserted Callias here as a way of flattering and currying favour with Hipponicus.[116]

28 Everyone knows that the Argives did not refuse to join the
Greek alliance but demanded to share equally in the command so
that they would not be under the control of the Lacedaemonians,
863C their most hateful enemy, and compelled to follow their bidding
on every occasion.[117] This had to be admitted but he suggests a most malicious explanation:[118] 'When the Greeks invited them, they made this demand, knowing full well that the Lacedaemonians would not give them a share in the command so that using them as an excuse they might take no part.' And he says that later some Argive ambassadors who were at Susa reminded Artaxerxes of these things and he replied that 'he considered no city friendlier than Argos'. And then giving way, as is his wont, and shrinking back he says he doesn't know exactly about these matters, but he does know that complaints can be made against all people and that:

> 863D the Argives were not the worst. But I am bound to report what is
> said, although I am not obligated to believe it entirely. And let what I've said here apply to my whole work. For indeed this too is also said of the Argives, namely, that they invited the Persians into Greece since their war with the Lacedaemonians was going badly and anything would be preferable to their present suffering.[119]

Well now, Herodotus has the Ethiopian say of the myrrh and purple, 'deceitful are the perfumes, deceitful the garments of the
Persians':[120] could one not say this very thing to him, i.e., deceitful
863E are the words, deceitful the exterior appearance of Herodotus'
account, 'devious and unsound and all twisted'.[121] Just as painters make the highlights brighter by the use of shadow, so does he not heighten his slanders by means of denials and does he not make

his suspicions deeper by the expression of uncertainty?[122] Now one cannot deny that the Argives, by not joining together with the Greeks and by yielding their reputation for bravery to the Lacedaemonians on account of the command, brought shame upon Heracles and their own noble heritage;[123] it would have been better to liberate Greece even if Siphnians or Cythnians[124] had been the leaders rather than, in quarrelling with the Spartiates over the command, forsake those many great battles. But if they were the 863F ones who invited the Persians into Greece because their war with the Lacedaemonians had been going badly, why did they not medize openly once the Persians had come? Or if they were unwilling to fight together with the Persians, why did they not, when left behind, ravage Laconian territory or seize Thyrea[125] or in some other way attack or harass the Lacedaemonians, since they could 864A have greatly harmed the Greek cause if they had not allowed the Lacedaemonians to march out to Plataea with so many hoplites?[126]

Well, then, he has here portrayed the Athenians at least as great 29 and called them 'saviours of Greece',[127] which was proper and just – indeed, except for the many slanderous remarks to be found amongst the praises! He says that the Lacedaemonians, when betrayed by the rest of the Greeks and isolated, would have performed great deeds and died nobly, or before this happened, they would have had to come to an agreement with Xerxes when they saw the rest of the Greeks taking the Persian side. It is clear that he says this not to praise the Athenians, but instead praises the Athenians in order to speak badly of all the others. For why would 864B one be amazed with him for continually reproaching the Thebans and Phocaeans in bitter and excessive terms[128] when he convicts those who actually underwent the risk on behalf of Greece not of actual treason but of a treason he reckoned they would commit?[129] And he raises doubts about the Lacedaemonians themselves, making it uncertain whether they would have fallen fighting against the enemy or handed themselves over: mistrusting, by God, those minor indications of their character at Thermopylae![130]

When he narrates the story of Ameinocles, the son of Creties of 30, 864C Magnesia, he says that he profited greatly from the shipwreck that befell the king's fleet and the many goods that washed ashore, acquiring an indescribable amount of gold and possessions, but he

doesn't allow this to pass without a biting comment and says, 'He became very wealthy from his discoveries but in all other respects he was not fortunate, for he had the horrible misfortune of killing his own son.'[131]

31 Aristophanes the Boeotian writes that Herodotus failed to
864D obtain money from the Thebans when he demanded it, and when he tried to converse and engage in philosophy with their young men, he was prevented by the magistrates because of their boorishness and dislike of argument.[132] There is no other evidence for this story. And yet Herodotus supports Aristophanes' account by the charges he himself levels against the Boeotians, narrating some things falsely, in other matters slandering them, and in still others writing as if he hated them or had quarrelled with them.[133] For he declares that the Thessalians medized at first from necessity and here he speaks the truth; and when he prophesies that the rest of the Greeks would have betrayed the Lacedaemonians, he adds 'not willingly but from necessity as the cities were captured
864E one by one'.[134] But he does not give the Thebans, who were under the same necessity, the same indulgence. And yet they sent 500 men with their commander Mnamias to Tempe, and to Thermopylae they sent as many as Leonidas demanded. And only these and the Thespians remained with him, all the rest departing once they were encircled.[135]

In fact, the Thebans accepted the king's terms only when they were hemmed in by great necessity: when the barbarian had control of the passes and was on their borders; when the Spartiate Demaratus, who was well minded towards Attaginus, the leader of the Theban oligarchy, because of their guest-friendship, had offered to make him a friend and guest-friend of the king, and when the Greeks were on their ships and no land army was com-
864F ing to their aid.[136] For they did not, like the Athenians, have ships and the sea at their disposal, nor did they dwell far off, like the Spartiates, in a remote part of Greece, but the Mede was only a day and a half away when they made their stand at the narrows and fought with only the Spartiates and the Thespians, and met
865A with misfortune. Now the historian is sufficiently fair to say that if the Lacedaemonians had been isolated and bereft of their allies they would have come to an agreement with Xerxes,[137] but he has

only abuse for the Thebans who suffered that very thing on account of the same necessity. Their greatest and finest deed he could not erase as if they had not done it, but he ruins it by attributing a discreditable motive and making it suspect.[138] He has written:

> So then the allies, having been ordered away, departed and they obeyed Leonidas' command. The Thespians and the Thebans alone remained behind with the Lacedaemonians. Of the two the Thebans remained reluctantly and against their will (for Leonidas had held on to them, considering them hostages) but the Thespians were especially willing and said they would never abandon and leave 865B
> Leonidas and those with him.[139]

Now then is it not clear that he has the same personal anger and ill will against the Thebans, which has caused him not only to slander the city falsely and unjustly but also not even to think out how to make his slander plausible, nor even see clearly that all but a few will realize that he is contradicting himself? For he says of Leonidas, 'when he perceived that the allies were not eager and were not willing to join in the danger, he ordered them to depart', and then a little later he says that he retained the Thebans against 865C
their will:[140] but if they were suspected of taking the Persian side, he should have dismissed them even if they were willing. In a situation where he had no need of any who were unwilling, what use could there have been in mixing together men whose loyalty was suspect with the actual fighters? For the king of the Spartiates and the leader of the Greeks could not have been of such a mind as to retain as hostages those 400, who were after all armed, together with the 300, and certainly not when the enemy was now attacking them from the front and behind. For even if previously he had brought them because he considered them hostages, when they were in these final moments, surely they would have given no 865D
thought to Leonidas and departed, and he would have had to fear an encirclement by *them* rather than by the Persians. And apart from this, how would it not have been ludicrous for Leonidas to order the rest of the Greeks to depart since death was at hand, but to prevent the Thebans from doing so in order that he – who was

about to die – might guard them for the Greeks? For if he were bringing them with him as hostages or rather as slaves, he ought not to have kept them with those who were going to die but rather handed them over to the Greeks who were departing.

The only other explanation – perhaps he kept them with him so
865E that they would be killed – the historian himself has removed by
his comments about Leonidas' love of glory. Here is exactly what he says: 'Leonidas, thinking these things over and wishing to lay up glory for the Spartiates alone, dismissed the allies, not because there were differences of opinion.'[141] It was the pinnacle of stupidity to deprive the allies of renown but to allow the enemy to share in it. It is clear, however, from what actually happened, that Leonidas was not suspicious of the Thebans but considered them reliable friends. For when, while leading his army, he had come into Thebes, he asked for and obtained something which no one else has ever obtained, namely to spend the night in the temple of
865F Heracles. And the vision which he saw in his sleep he reported to
the Thebans. He seemed to see the most distinguished cities of Greece on a rough and stormy sea, and they were being carried and tossed about capriciously, but the city of Thebes was above all of them and raised to the sky, and then suddenly disappeared.
866A And this was similar to what happened to the city later in time.[142]

32 In his narrative of the battle Herodotus has obscured Leonidas'
great accomplishment, saying that all fell there in the narrows by the hill.[143] But it happened otherwise. When they perceived during the night that the enemy was encircling them, they rose up and made for the camp and nearly reached the king's tent, intending to kill the king himself or die in the attempt. They slaughtered everyone whom they met as far as the tent and caused the rest to retreat as they went forward. But Xerxes was not found, and inasmuch as they were looking for him in a great and immense army and were wandering about, still it was only with difficulty that the barbar-
866B ians slew them when they had surrounded them from every side.[144]
Now all the daring acts in addition to this one and the remarks left behind by the Spartiates will be recorded in a *Life* of Leonidas,[145] but it is not inappropriate even here to mention a few. They celebrated their own funeral games before they left Sparta while their mothers and fathers looked on. To someone who remarked

that he was leading entirely too few men to battle, Leonidas himself said, 'But many enough to die.' To his wife who asked as he was leaving whether he had something to say, he turned and said, 'Marry good husbands and bear good children.' At Thermopylae,
after the encirclement, he wished to save two men of good family 866C
and gave a letter to one of them, and tried to send him off; but the other would not accept it and said angrily, 'I came with you as a fighter, not as a messenger.' He ordered the other of the two to give a message to the magistrates at Sparta <. . .> matters,[146] hoisting his shield he took his place in the ranks.[147] Now one would find fault with anyone else who omitted these things. But the man who recorded and memorialized the fart of Amasis and the thief who drove his asses and gave over his wine,[148] and many other things of this sort would seem to have omitted fair deeds
and fair words not from carelessness or in oversight but because 866D
he is neither well disposed nor fair minded towards certain people.

Herodotus says that the Thebans who were with the Hellenes at 33
first fought from compulsion. For not only Xerxes, it seems, but Leonidas as well had attendants armed with whips and it was by these that the Thebans were compelled to fight against their will. Now could any malicious prosecutor be crueller than this man, who says that those who had the capability of departing and escaping fought from necessity but that those for whom no support was at hand medized willingly?[149] Right after this he has written that when the rest:

> were making for the hill, the Thebans split off and were stretching
> out their hands and approaching nearer to the Persians, saying (the 866E
> truest thing they ever said) that they had medized and had given earth and water to the king, that they had come to Thermopylae under compulsion and that they were not responsible for the damage done to the king. And by saying this they survived, for they had the Thessalians as witnesses of what they had said.[150]

Imagine this pleading being heard as everything was going on amidst the barbarian cries and the thorough commotion and the flights and pursuits, and then the examination of witnesses, and the Thessalians, giving evidence amongst men being slain and

tangled underfoot, saying that until recently they were masters of
866F Greece as far as Thespiae but the Thebans defeated us in battle and drove us out and they killed our commander Lattamyas. For that was how things stood with the Boeotians and the Thessalians at that time: there was nothing fair or friendly between them.[151] But let us say that the Thessalians did serve as witnesses: how did the Thebans survive? 'The Persians killed some of them as they approached,' as he himself says, 'but the majority on Xerxes' orders were branded with the royal mark, beginning with their
867A general Leontiades.'[152] But it was not Leontiades[153] who was general at Thermopylae but rather Alexander, as Aristophanes in his *Records by Archons* and Nicander of Colophon have written.[154] And nobody at all before that knows of any Thebans being branded by Xerxes. It would have been the best defence against such slander, and the city would have done well to be proud of those brandings since Xerxes would thus have treated Leonidas and Leontiades as his most hated enemies: the former's body he mutilated after death and the latter he branded while still alive.[155] Herodotus considers that the savagery directed against Leonidas
867B revealed that the Persian king was angry with Leonidas (when alive) more than any other man; but when he says that the Thebans medized at Thermopylae and were branded and that, although branded, they no less eagerly medized at Plataea, then it seems to me that just like Hippocleides gesticulating with his legs on the table, one could say that Herodotus has 'danced away' the truth and that 'Herodotus doesn't care'.[156]

34 In the eighth Book he says that the Hellenes in fear were planning a flight from Artemisium to the interior of Greece, and when the Euboeans begged them to wait a short time so that they could remove their families and households, they paid no attention until Themistocles obtained money and shared it with Eurybiades and
867C Adeimantus, the Corinthian general; and only then did they wait and fight the sea battle. Yet Pindar, who did not come from an allied city but one which was charged with medism, when he remembers Artemisium proclaims:

> where the sons
> of the Athenians laid the splendid cornerstone of freedom.[157]

But Herodotus, who some think has glorified Greece, portrays the victory as a work of bribery and theft, and the Greeks as fighting unwillingly, having been deceived by their generals who had taken bribes.

Nor was this the limit of his malice. Nearly everyone agrees that the Greeks were victorious there in the sea battles but that they yielded Artemisium to the barbarians when they learned what had happened at Thermopylae, since there was no benefit to be had by remaining there and guarding the sea, now that the war was south of the Gates and Xerxes was master of the passes.[158] But Herodotus has the Greeks wishing to run away even before announcing the death of Leonidas. He says as follows: 'They had been treated roughly, especially the Athenians, half of whose ships had been damaged, and so they planned to run away into Greece.' Now one can describe or criticize a retreat before battle as 'running away'; but he called it 'running away' before this, and now denotes it as 'running away' and will a little later again speak of 'running away'.[159] With such bitterness does he cling to the term. 'Immediately after this a man from Hestiaea came to the Persians announcing that the Greeks had run away from Artemisium. The Persians, disbelieving him, held him under guard and dispatched swift ships to examine the situation for themselves.'[160] What are you saying? That they ran away as if they had been defeated, but that the enemy after the battle could not believe that they had run off in flight since they had won a convincing victory? And is it worthwhile to trust Herodotus concerning any single man or city when, with one phrase, he takes away the victory from Greece, takes down the trophies and the inscriptions which they set up in the temple of Artemis Facing East, and portrays this as boasting and bombast?[161] The verse reads thus:

867D 867E 867F

> The races of all sorts of men from the land of Asia
> the sons of the Athenians, once on this sea,
> subdued in battle, when they destroyed the army of the Medes
> and offered these tokens to the virgin Artemis.[162] 868A

In his account of the battles he did not note the Greek battle order nor did he reveal what position each city held in the sea battle, and

in their departure, which he himself calls a 'running away', he says the Corinthians sailed first in the line, the Athenians last.[163]

35 He ought not to have ridden so roughshod over those of the Greeks who medized, since although he is thought by the rest to have been Thurian, he himself is really protective of the Halicarnassians, those Dorians who marched against Greece with their harem accompanying them![164] But he is so far from speaking in any way mildly when discussing the necessities of those who
868B medized that when he comes to tell of the Thessalians, who sent to the Phocaeans, their bitterest enemies, offering to leave their land unharmed for the price of fifty talents, he writes in these words: 'For the Phocaeans, alone of the peoples in this part of Greece, had not medized, and for no other reason, as I calculate, than for their hatred of the Thessalians. If the Thessalians had taken the Greek side, the Phocaeans, I think, would have medized.'[165] And yet a little further on he himself says that thirteen cities of the Phocaeans were burned down by the Persians, their
868C territory was laid waste, the temple at Abai was set on fire and all the men and women who could not reach Parnassus ahead of the Persians perished.[166] Nevertheless he ascribes the same wickedness to these people, who underwent the greatest sufferings for not abandoning what was noble, as to those who most eagerly medized. And since he could not find fault with these men's deeds, he sat at his desk and composed ignoble causes and suspicions against them, bidding us judge their intention not based on what they actually did but on what they would have done if the Thessalians had not decided as they had – as if they had to abandon the position of traitor because it was already occupied by others![167]

868D Now suppose that someone tried to excuse the Thessalians' medism by saying that they did not want to medize, but did so against their will because of their differences with the Phocaeans whom they saw taking the Greek side: would it not seem that such a writer was engaged in the most shameful flattery and was distorting the truth by fashioning good reasons for bad actions? I think it would. So then how is it not an absolutely clear case of false accusation when he declares that the Phocaeans chose the better cause not because of virtue but because they decided to take the opposite side to the Thessalians? Nor does he here, as is his

usual way, ascribe the slander to others by saying that he heard it,
but rather that he 'calculated' it. He ought to have cited the evi- 868E
dence that persuaded him that those who behaved like the best
had the same motives as the worst.

But this charge of mutual enmity is ludicrous. Neither the
Aeginetans' differences with Athens nor the Chalcidians' with
Eretria nor the Corinthians' with Megara prevented them from
joining the Greek alliance.[168] And on the other side, the Thes-
salians were not dissuaded from taking the Persians' side just
because the Macedonians, their bitterest enemy, had done the
same. For the common danger made private grievances disappear
such that all other feelings were driven out, and men inclined
either to noble action because of their character or to what was
advantageous because of necessity. And in fact after the danger of
destruction at the hands of the Medes had passed, these men again 868F
changed back to the Greek side, and Lacrates the Spartiate testi-
fied on their behalf.[169] And Herodotus himself, dislodged from his
unusual position, admits in his narrative of Plataea that the Pho-
cians were in fact on the Greek side.[170]

But one need not be surprised if he bitterly presses upon the 36
unfortunate when he transforms even those who took the Greek
side and shared in the danger into enemies and traitors. The Nax- 869A
ians sent three ships as allies to the Persians, but one of the
captains, Democritus, persuaded the others to take the side of the
Greeks.[171] He does not know how to praise without blaming: to
praise one man he has to ruin the reputation of an entire city and
people. Of earlier writers Hellanicus, and of later writers Ephorus
both bear witness against Herodotus: the former says that the
Naxians sent six ships, the latter five ships, to assist in the Greek
cause.[172] And Herodotus actually convicts himself of fabrication:
the local historians of Naxos say that the Naxians warded off 869B
Megabates when he attacked the island with 200 ships and later
the Persian general Datis when he sailed against them with a hun-
dred ships after he had burned <. . .>[173] to do harm. But if, as
Herodotus has said elsewhere, the Persians burned and destroyed
their city and the men survived by fleeing to the mountains, then
surely the Naxians had a fine reason for sending help to those who
destroyed their country, but not for joining in the fight with those

fighting for the common freedom![174] That he composed this falsehood not to praise Democritus but to bring shame upon the Naxians is evident from his omission of and silence about the suc-
869C cess and bravery of Democritus[175] which Simonides has revealed in his epigram:[176]

Democritus was the third[177] to join battle, when at Salamis
the Greeks clashed with the Medes at sea.
Five ships of the enemy he captured, and a sixth, a Dorian,
he rescued as it was being captured by a barbarian hand.

37 But why should one be annoyed about the Naxians? For if antipodean peoples exist, as some say, dwelling in the underside of the world, I think even they have not failed to hear of Themistocles, and Themistocles' counsel, the one whereby he counselled the
869D Greeks to fight a sea battle at Salamis and after which he built a temple in Melite to Artemis of the Best Counsel.[178] But this charming historian does everything he can to take away Themistocles' renown and transfer it to another; here are his exact words: 'And at that point, when Themistocles had come to his ship, Mnesiphilus, an Athenian, asked him what had been decided. When he learned from him that the decision was to sail to the Isthmus and fight there for the Peloponnese, he said, "If you remove the ships from Salamis, you will not be fighting any longer for a single
869E country. For each will go home to his own city." ' And a little later: ' "But if there is some way, go and try to confound these plans, if you can somehow persuade Eurybiades to change his mind and remain here." ' Then he adds that 'the proposition pleased Themistocles very much and, making no answer to Mnesiphilus', he went to Eurybiades and he has written (again his exact words), 'and sitting beside him Themistocles enumerates all those things he heard from Mnesiphilus, pretending they are his own and adding other things in addition'.[179] Do you see that by saying that his plan was actually Mnesiphilus' he attributes *to Themistocles* a reputation for malice?

38, 869F In further mockery of the Greeks he says that Themistocles did not understand what was beneficial but overlooked it (the very man who was nicknamed 'Odysseus' for his understanding).[180]

But Artemisia, Herodotus' fellow citizen, instructed by no one
and thinking it up on her own, could say to Xerxes that:

> the Greeks will not be able to withstand you for long, but you will
> make them scatter and each will flee to his own city. And if you 870A
> march the army to the Peloponnese, it is not likely that they will
> remain, nor will they care to fight on behalf of the Athenians. But if
> you rush to fight at sea, I fear that the navy, coming to grief, will
> destroy the army as well.[181]

Her remarks lack only metre for Herodotus to portray Artemisia
as a Sibyl prophesying the future so accurately. And so Xerxes
handed his own children over to her to lead back to Susa. He
seems to have forgotten to bring women from Susa, if the children
needed a female escort.[182]

Well, let us take no account of his lies in general but examine 39, 870B
instead those lies which are told to someone's detriment. He says
that the Athenians claim that Adeimantus, the Corinthian general,
when the enemy were at hand, was overwhelmed with terror
and fled, not by backing water or quietly slipping through the
enemy ships but raising sail openly and turning all his ships
around; but then a boat speeding along met up with him as he
approached the end of Salamis and from the boat a voice spoke,
'Adeimantus, in your flight you are betraying the Greeks. But they
in fact are winning and they have mastered the enemy just as they
desired.'[183] This boat, it seems, fell down from heaven: and indeed 870C
why should he have spared the tragic crane when everywhere else
in his history he surpasses the tragic poets in imposture?[184] And
Adeimantus, trusting the voice, returned to camp when it was all
over. This is the Athenians' story but 'the Corinthians do not
agree but consider themselves to have played a most distinguished
part in the sea battle; and the rest of Greece bears witness to
them'.[185] The man is like this in many places: he offers different
slanders and accusations against different people, with the result
that he cannot fail to make someone, at any rate, seem wicked.
Just as here the net result for him is that the Corinthians are dis- 870D
graced if the slander is believed, and the Athenians if it is
disbelieved. But I don't think the Athenians ever made this charge

against the Corinthians; I think Herodotus made these false allegations about both at the same time. Thucydides, at least, where he has an Athenian speaking in opposition to the Corinthians in Lacedaemon, and the Athenian is taking great pride in Athens' deeds in the Persian Wars and in the battle of Salamis, has levelled no charge of treason or desertion against the Corinthians.[186] And it's not likely that they would defame the Corinthians in this matter when they could see the name of the Corinthians engraved
870E third, after the Lacedaemonians and themselves, on the dedication of spoils taken from the Persians;[187] and on Salamis itself they gave permission for the men to be buried near the town and to have this elegy inscribed:[188]

> Stranger, we once dwelt in the well-watered city of Corinth,
> but now Salamis, the isle of Ajax, holds us.
> Here, capturing the ships of Phoenicians and Persians
> and Medes, we saved sacred Hellas.

And the cenotaph at the Isthmus has this inscription:[189]

> When all Hellas was standing upon the razor's edge
> we saved her with our lives, and here lie dead.

870F And the following is inscribed on the dedications of Diodorus, a Corinthian commander, in the temple of Leto:[190]

> These weapons from the enemy Medes the sailors of Diodorus
> dedicated to Leto as memorials of the sea battle.

And as for Adeimantus himself, whom Herodotus continually reproaches for 'being the only general to resist, saying that he would flee from Artemisium and not remain', look at the renown he held:[191]

> This is the grave of that Adeimantus, through whom
> all Hellas put on the crown of freedom.

871A Now it was not likely that a coward and a traitor would have received such honours when he died, nor would he have dared to

name his daughters Nausinike, Acrothinion and Alixibian and his son Aristeus if he had won no renown or brilliance from those deeds.[192]

And further, the Corinthian women, alone of Greek women, made that beautiful and divine prayer, asking the goddess to implant in their husbands a passionate desire to fight against the Persians. It is not credible that Herodotus was ignorant of this; it must have been known even to the remotest Carian,[193] since the matter was widely publicized and Simonides wrote an epigram 871B
when bronze statues of the women were dedicated in the temple of Aphrodite, the temple Medea had built either when she was no longer in love with her husband (as some report) or (as others say) when the goddess ended Jason's love for Thetis.[194] This is the epigram:[195]

> Here stand the women who, for the Greeks and their
> stalwart fighting citizens, prayed to the divine Cypris:
> for shining Aphrodite took care that the citadel of Greece
> should not be betrayed to the bow-bearing Medes.

It was these things he should have written and remembered rather than throw in the misfortune of Ameinocles killing his son.[196] 871C

Having had his fill of charges against Themistocles, in which he 40
says that Themistocles did not cease to steal and demand more from the islanders unbeknown to the other commanders,[197] he finally takes the crown away from the Athenians and puts it on the Aeginetans, writing as follows: 'The Greeks sent the first fruits of the spoils to Delphi and they asked the god in common if the spoils he had received were sufficient and pleasing. And he replied that those from the rest of the Greeks were but those from the Aeginetans were not. He was demanding from them the prize of valour they had won at Salamis.'[198] So it is no longer to Scythians[199] or Persians or Egyptians that he attributes his fictional 871D
speeches (as Aesop had done for crows and monkeys)[200] but now, using the character of the Pythia, he thrusts aside from Athens the first prize won at Salamis.[201] When he told of Themistocles being awarded second prize at the Isthmus because each of the generals had awarded himself first prize and Themistocles second, and of

there being no decision in the end,[202] he ought to have found fault
with their individual ambition,[203] but he says only that the Greeks
sailed away, unwilling to proclaim Themistocles as first because
of jealousy.[204]

41 In the ninth and final book, he was keen to pour out as much of
his ill will towards the Lacedaemonians that remained, and to the
extent he could, he took away from the city its renowned victory
871E and much-celebrated success at Plataea. He has written that previ-
ously the Lacedaemonians were afraid that the Athenians would
be persuaded by Mardonius and would leave the Greek alliance,
but that when the Isthmus was walled off and they thought the
Peloponnese was safe, they no longer took thought for the rest and
disregarded them, celebrating a festival at home, detaining the
Athenian ambassadors, and wasting time.[205] So how then did
5,000 Spartiates, each served by seven helots, march out to Pla-
taea? How did they take upon themselves so great a danger and
then conquer and destroy so many myriads? Listen to this believ-
871F able explanation: there happened to be at Sparta, he says, a man
named Chileos from Tegea, who was visiting there, and some of
the ephors were his friends and guest-friends. It was this Chileos
who persuaded them to dispatch the army, saying that walling off
the Isthmus would be no help to the Peloponnesians if the Athen-
ians should go over to Mardonius.[206] This is what brought
872A Pausanias and his forces to Plataea. And if some private affair had
kept that Chileos back home in Tegea, Greece would not have
survived![207]

42 He does not know what to do with the Athenians, shifting up
and down, raising the city up sometimes, sometimes casting it
down: he says the Athenians disputed with the Tegeans over who
would hold second place in the line, and they recalled the children
of Heracles and their actions against the Amazons, and they cited
their burial of the Peloponnesians who had fallen at the foot of the
Cadmeia, and finally they came down in their speech to
Marathon – all this in emulous rivalry and with a longing to
obtain the command of the left wing.[208] Yet a little later Pausanias
872B and the Spartiates yield to them the command, exhorting them to
take the right wing and be stationed opposite the Persians, and to
give themselves the left wing, as if declining the battle against the

barbarians because of their inexperience.[209] And yet it's ridiculous to be unwilling to fight unless the enemy is already familiar.

As for the rest of the Greeks, who were ordered to another camp, he says that when they moved forward, they were happy to flee from the enemy's cavalry to the city of Plataea, and in their flight they came to the Heraion.[210] In this account he has somehow accused all of them simultaneously of disobedience, desertion and treason. And in the end he says that only the Lacedaemonians and Tegeans 872C
met and fought the Persians, and the Athenians the Thebans,[211] and he has deprived absolutely all the other cities of any share in the success. Not one of them joined with the others in battle but all sat with their weapons nearby, abandoning and betraying those who were fighting on their behalf. At a later point, when the Phleiasians and the Megarians learned that Pausanias was winning, they rushed into the fray, fell in with the Theban cavalry, and were shamefully destroyed. The Corinthians did not participate in the battle but after the victory they hastened through the hills so as not to fall in with the Theban cavalry.[212] For the Thebans, when the 872D
rout occurred, brought their cavalry in front of the barbarians and eagerly aided them in their flight – paying them back, no doubt, for the brands they had received at Thermopylae![213] But the Corinthians' place in the line of battle when they fought with the barbarians and the great honour that accrued to them from the battle at Plataea one can learn from Simonides' words about them:[214]

> In the middle the inhabitants of Ephyra of many springs,
> skilled in every form of bravery in war
> dwelling in Glaucus' city, the town of Corinth,

who 872E

> established as the fairest witness of their toils
> the gold honoured on high.[215] And it will increase
> the wide report of themselves and their fathers.

Now Simonides did not teach that to a chorus in Corinth nor did he compose it as a hymn for the city, but he wrote it simply as a narrative of those events.[216]

But Herodotus, anticipating that his lie could be refuted by those who would ask where then the many common graves and great number of tombs and memorials came from – those which up to the present day[217] the Plataeans give offerings to when the Greeks are present – has made an accusation even more shameful
872F than their betrayal of their countrymen: 'Of the rest, all those graves still to be seen in Plataea, these are, so I learn, empty mounds, heaped up by those ashamed of having been absent from the battle and made for the sake of future generations.'[218] Herodotus alone of all men has heard of this absence from battle, this treason, while Pausanias and Aristides and the Lacedaemonians and the Athenians were unaware that the Greeks had abandoned
873A the contest. But neither did the Athenians prevent the name of the Aeginetans, with whom they were at odds, from the inscription,[219] nor did they refute the Corinthians whom previously they had claimed took flight at Salamis, though Greece testified to the opposite. And yet Cleadas of Plataea ten years after the Persian Wars, in order to curry favour with the Aeginetans, built, according to Herodotus, the grave that bears their name.[220] And yet how was it that the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians immediately after the battle nearly came to blows over the erection of the trophy, but still did not deprive of the spoils those Greeks who were cowardly and had run away, but instead inscribed their names on
873B the tripods and the statues, gave them a share of the spoils,[221] and finally, composed and inscribed on the altar:[222]

> The Greeks, once by the power of victory and the work of Ares,
> having driven out the Persians, established for a free Greece
> this common altar of Zeus Eleutherios.

Surely, my dear Herodotus, this was not written by Cleades or someone else in an attempt to flatter the cities? Why then did they need to go through the useless trouble of digging up earth and act fraudulently in fashioning mounds and memorials for the sake of
873C future generations when they could see their renown consecrated on the most distinguished dedications? Indeed Pausanias, so they say, when he already had aspirations to tyrannical power, had inscribed at Delphi:[223]

When he destroyed the army of the Medes, the Greek leader
Pausanias dedicated this memorial to Phoebus.

He called himself 'leader of the Greeks', making them sharers to
some extent of his glory. But when the Greeks would not accept
this and complained, the Lacedaemonians erased this and
inscribed the names of the cities, as was right. And yet how likely 873D
is it that the Greeks would have resented not being included in the
inscription if they knew that they had not been present at the bat-
tle, or that the Lacedaemonians would have erased the name of
their leader and general and instead inscribed the names of those
who had avoided and ignored the danger? Isn't it very strange that
Sochares and Aeimnestus[224] and those who fought so brilliantly in
that battle bore no resentment that the names of the Cythnians
and the Melians[225] were engraved on the trophies, while Herod-
otus ascribes the struggle to three cities alone and all the rest he
uninscribes from the trophies and the sacred dedications?

So, then, of the four contests that were waged at that time 43
against the barbarians,[226] he says that the Greeks ran away from 873E
Artemisium and at Thermopylae their general and king bore the
brunt of the danger, while they stayed home and took no thought
for things, instead celebrating the Olympian and Carneian festi-
vals. In his narrative of Salamis, he has used more words telling
about Artemisia than he has for the entire naval battle. And finally
he has the Greeks at Plataea ignorant of the battle until the end (as
if it were the battle of frogs and mice which Pigres, the son of
Artemisia, described in his jesting nonsense-epic)[227] and they had
made an agreement to fight in silence so the rest would be unaware,
and that the Lacedaemonians were in no way superior to the bar-
barians in bravery but had won because they were fighting men 873F
who were unarmed and naked. When Xerxes himself was present 874A
and his men were being driven by the whip from behind, the Per-
sians still could hardly bring themselves to attack the Greeks, but
at Plataea, it seems, they had taken on other spirits: 'in spirit and
strength they were not deficient, but their equipment, which
lacked protective armour, hurt them, for they were light-armed
troops fighting against men who were hoplites'.[228] What renown
or grandeur is left to the Greeks from those contests if the

Lacedaemonians fought against unarmed men[229] and the battle took place without the rest realizing it, and the graves that are honoured by each man's descendants are empty, and the tripods
874B and altars erected for the gods are full of false inscriptions, and Herodotus alone knows the truth and all other men who have accounts of the Greeks have been deceived by a tradition about the victories of those times which is overgrown?

What can we say, then? The man knows how to write, his account is pleasurable and there is charm, force and grace in his narrative, and he has 'recounted his tale like a poet' not 'knowledgeably' but instead sweetly and with polish.[230] It is no doubt these aspects that beguile and win over everyone; but just as one must watch out for the rose-beetle amongst the roses, so one must be on one's guard against Herodotus' defamation and abuse, which lie beneath a smooth and soft appearance, lest we unwittingly accept absurd and
874C false notions about the best and greatest cities and men of Greece.

Following are several remarks made by Plutarch in his Lives *and essays which bear on the subject of history.*

On the Difference between History and Biography

(*Alexander* 1.1–3)

In this Book my subject is Alexander the king and the Caesar who overthrew Pompey.[231] Because of the abundance of the deeds associated with both men, we shall say nothing by way of preface other than to ask the indulgence of our readers if we do not narrate all their great deeds or even deal exhaustively with any of
2 the famous ones. For we are composing not histories but biographies and it is not always in the most famous actions that one sees virtue or vice revealed, but it is often a little thing or remark or some jest that makes an impression of someone's character, rather than battles in which countless people die or enormous lines of
3 soldiers or sieges of cities. Just as painters take the likeness from the face and expression of the eyes where character is revealed and

pay little attention to the rest of the person, so too we must be allowed to penetrate to the signs of the soul, and through these to make a portrait of each man's life, yielding to others the great achievements and the struggles.[232]

On Mythic Material in History

(*Theseus* 1.1–5)

Just as geographers, dear Sosius Senecio,[233] squeeze those parts of the world that they know nothing about in the margins of their maps and explain that 'what lies beyond this are waterless deserts full of monsters', 'trackless swamps', 'Scythian frost' or 'frozen
seas', so I too, now that I have in the writing of my parallel lives 2
gone past the period in which one can employ probability and
offer a history that relies on events,[234] could say about this earlier 3
time 'what lies beyond this are monsters and material for tragedy, where poets and legend-writers dwell, and where one can no
longer find trustworthy or clear accounts'.[235] But when we had 4
published our account of Lycurgus the lawgiver and Numa the king, we thought not illogically to go back further to Romulus,[236] since we were already close to his time period, and when I thought (in the words of Aeschylus)[237]

> Who will meet such a man?
> Whom shall I array against him? Who is capable?

it seemed that the founder of the fair and fabled Athens should be 5
set against and compared to the father of unconquered and far-famed Rome. Our task, therefore, is to purify mythical material and make it obey reason and take on the appearance of history. But where this material arrogantly disdains believability and refuses any admixture of probability, we shall ask our readers' indulgence that they accept affably this account of ancient tradition.[238]

Difficulties in Finding the Truth

(*Pericles* 13.16)

Indeed who would be surprised[239] that men who live debauched lives consistently offer their slanders against their betters in sacrifice to the envy of the multitude as if to some evil spirit, when even Stesimbrotus of Thasos[240] has dared to spread abroad the terrible and abominable impious act of Pericles in regard to his son's wife? It seems that it is always so difficult to track down the truth by research, since later writers find that time obstructs the knowledge of events, while history and biography written contemporary with the events maim and distort the truth, sometimes because of jealousy and hostility, sometimes because of a desire to curry favour or flatter.[241]

Relationship of Historians to their History

(*On the Glory of the Athenians*, 345D–F)

For if you take away those who do the deeds, you will not have the writers of deeds.[242] Take away Pericles' administration of the city, the naval trophies of Phormio at Rhium, the brave deeds of Nicias at Cythera, Megara and Corinth, Demosthenes' actions at Pylos, Cleon's 400 prisoners, Tolmides' circumnavigation of the Peloponnese and Myronides' victory over the Boeotians at Oenophyta – take all these away and you can cross off Thucydides.[243] Take away Alcibiades' daring actions at the Hellespont, those of Thrasyllus at Lesbos, Theramenes' overthrow of the oligarchy, Thrasybulus and Archinus and the seventy men from Phyle who rose up against Spartiate rule, Conon re-embarking the Athenians upon the sea – and Cratippus is done away with.[244]

345E Now Xenophon became his own history,[245] composing his military exploits and his successes and ascribing the account of them to Themistogenes of Syracuse so that he would be more trustworthy writing about himself as if it were a different person, and

giving someone else the renown that accrued to his writings.[246] But all the rest of the historians – Cleidemus, Diyllus, Philochorus, Phylarchus – became for the deeds of others like dramatic actors, arranging the actions of generals and kings and covering themselves with their accounts of those men so that they might share in their light and splendour.[247] For the image of another's renown is reflected 345F from those who do the deeds to those who compose them, and it lights up anew, when the deed is revealed through words as if in a mirror.[248]

Vividness in History

(*On the Glory of the Athenians*, 347A)

Simonides calls painting silent poetry and poetry painting that speaks.[249] Literature narrates and records as having already happened those actions which painters represent as happening in the moment. They represent the same things, one group with colours and forms, the other with words and phrases; they differ in the medium and manner of their representation but both have one goal, and the best historian makes his narrative like a painting in its emotions and characters. Thucydides, for example, always strives in his account for this vividness,[250] desiring ardently to make the listener like a viewer and to produce in his readers the feelings of surprise and confusion of those who actually saw the events: Demosthenes arranging the Athenians along the very reef at Pylos; Brasidas urging his pilot to beach his ship and hurrying to the gangway, being wounded, fainting and falling forward onto the prow; the Lacedaemonians fighting a land battle from the sea while the Athenians fight a sea battle from land.[251] And again in the Sicilian narrative:[252]

> Both sides' armies from the shore had much anxiety and conflict of spirit so long as the sea battle was equally balanced . . . because of the continued indecisiveness of the battle, in their fear swaying with their very bodies in sympathy with their minds.

In the arrangement and representation of the events <they do not fall short of> pictorial vividness; <but nonetheless>[253] if it is not appropriate to compare painters with generals, let us not compare historians with them either.

28. PLUTARCH

1. For all aspects of Pl., K. Ziegler, *RE* XXI.1 (1951) pp. 636–92 should be consulted. On Pl.'s life and times, C. P. Jones, *Plutarch and Rome* (Oxford, 1971) is fundamental. For Ammonius see the same author's 'The Teacher of Plutarch', *HSCPh* 71 (1967) pp. 205–13. D. A. Russell's *Plutarch* (London and New York, 1973) has much of value in its background information and insightful readings. For Pl.'s *Lives* see: A. Wardman, *Plutarch's Lives* (London, 1974) and the studies of C. Pelling in his *Plutarch and History: Eighteen Studies* (Swansea and London, 2000). Important collections of essays are: *ANRW* II.33.6 (1991); P. Stadter, ed., *Plutarch and the Historical Tradition* (London and New York, 1992);

B. Scardigli, ed., *Essays on Plutarch's* Lives (Oxford, 1995); and J. Mossman, ed., *Plutarch and his Intellectual World* (Swansea and London, 1997). On Pl.'s *Malice* and his attitudes towards history see C. Theander, *Plutarch und die Geschichte* (Lund, 1951); P. A. Stadter, *Plutarch's Historical Methods* (Cambridge, Mass., 1975); J. W. Boake, *Plutarch's Historical Judgment with Special Reference to the De Herodoti Malignitate* (diss. Toronto, 1975); the studies of Pelling just mentioned and the same author's 'De Malignitate Plutarchi: Plutarch, Herodotus, and the Persian Wars', in E. Bridges et al., eds., *Cultural Responses to the Persian Wars* (Oxford, 2007) pp. 145–65. There is a very useful edition of the *Malice* with Greek text, English translation and copious historical notes in A. J. Bowen, *Plutarch: The Malice of Herodotus* (Warminster, 1992); see also M. Grimaldi, *La malignità di Erodoto* (Naples, 2004).

2. There is a gap in the text: the supplement as printed here would have Pl. echo the opening of H.'s own text.

3. A number of Pl.'s works are dedicated (e.g., the *Parallel Lives* to Sosius Senecio, a high-ranking Roman official); the identity of this Alexander is not certain but it is likely that he is Alexander the Epicurean, known from Pl.'s *Table Talk* (2.3.1) and two honorary inscriptions from the Athenian agora. Boake (n. 1) pp. 390–96 suggests it is Alexander of Kotyaeon, the teacher of Marcus Aurelius, but this has generally not been accepted.

4. For the importance of the historian's character in evaluating his work see *ATAH* pp. 128–74. Style and character are often seen as closely related, but Pl. seems to be making two separate points, i.e., that neither H.'s style nor his character is what it seems.

5. Plato, *Republic* 361a.

6. There is a gap in the manuscripts here of three or four lines. The object of the phrase that follows, 'he has especially employed', must be something like 'this malice'.

7. See chapters 31, 33 for his defence of the Boeotians; 22, 39, 42 for the Corinthians.

8. The quotation is from a lost play (*TrGF* F 865).

9. Philip V, king of Macedon from 221 to 179, claimed to be liberating the Greeks from Roman control, but his manner and actions alienated some of them, who then defected to the Romans. He was defeated by the Romans at the battle of Cynoscephalae in 197, after which Titus Quinctius Flamininus proclaimed 'the freedom of the Greeks' at the Isthmian games. This line recurs in slightly altered form in Pl.'s *Life of Flamininus* (10.2), where it is ascribed in a slightly different context to the Aetolians.

10. On Theopompus' malice see above, p. 31; at *Lysander* 30.2 Pl. says that one trusts Theopompus more when he praises than when he criticizes.
11. 'Tokens' here are those employed in recognition scenes in Greek tragedy.
12. For similar concerns about the historian's lexical choices, see P. 8. 10–11, 12.25; L. *Hist.* 59.
13. Nicias, the Athenian general in command of the expedition against Sicily during the Peloponnesian War, was famed for his piety and devotion to divination; the latter phrase here comes from T. 7.50.4, at the point where Nicias refuses to move his troops after an eclipse (with disastrous results); Pl. treats the story at *Nicias* 23, where he does refer to Nicias' 'superstition' (*deisidaimonia*) but with a term different from the one here (*theolēptos*).
14. Athenian leader in the late fifth century, consistently reviled in our sources, especially by the comic poets. The phrase here is from T. 4.28.5, where the characterization of Cleon is ascribed to the Athenians in light of Cleon's promise to finish off the campaign against the Spartans on Sphacteria within twenty days (which, despite their contempt, he in fact does).
15. The reading here is uncertain; there may be a lacuna in the text.
16. Hyperbolus, like Cleon a popular leader, was prominent in the later phases of the Peloponnesian War, and is, like Cleon, much criticized in the comic poets; the last victim of the Athenian practice of ostracism, he was forced to leave Athens in 417 or 416 BCE and was killed in 411 on the island of Samos: T. 8.73.3, where he is called 'a scoundrel'; cf. *HCT* vol. 5 pp. 257–64; *CT* vol. 3 pp. 968–72.
17. For Philistus see D.H. *Pomp.* 5.2, where his character is defined as, among other things, that of a tyrant-lover, since he portrayed Dionysius' rule as tyrant in Syracuse in a favourable light.
18. On digressions see Intro. §12.
19. The line, from an unknown play (*TrGF* Adespota 388), is quoted by Pl. at *On Curiosity* 520B, with the addition of 'damn you' at the beginning.
20. For a similar sentiment see Cic. *On the Orator* 2.62, and the places where historians claim 'neither to have added anything nor taken anything away': D.H. n. 19.
21. For sophists, see P. n. 135. Pl. is here thinking of two aspects that came to be seen as characteristic of them: the ability to speak at length even on trivial subjects (e.g., 'praise of salt') and their notorious ability to 'make the stronger case the weaker'. Cf. below, 15, 857F, where Pl. objects to H.'s characterization of Solon as a *sophistēs*.

22. The expression here is ambiguous and it is not clear what exactly 'the better' and 'worse account' are: does Pl. mean 'more/less credible' or 'more/less favourable'? The latter might seem to display a certain naïveté for which Pl. has often been faulted; but in light of his remark at *Cimon* 2.4–5 this is almost certainly what he means: see further Russell (n. 1), pp. 61–2.
23. On Ephorus, see above, p. 25; this fragment is *FGrHist* 70 F 189.
24. For Themistocles see Cic. n. 12. Pl. tells this story at *Themistocles* 23, clearly basing himself on Ephorus there (though he does not name him). For Pausanias see D.H. n. 100. Although Themistocles and Pausanias were the architects of the two greatest victories of the Persian Wars, both men shortly thereafter fell out with their respective cities. Pausanias was accused of collaborating with the Persians and recalled to Sparta, where he fled to a temple and was starved to death; Themistocles was ostracized and then exiled from Athens and eventually made his way to the Persian court, but died before doing anything in partnership with the king. The fates of both men are treated at T. 1.128.3–138, where, as Pl. notes, no mention is made of collusion between Themistocles and Pausanias.
25. Similarly, Aristotle in the *Rhetoric* says that malice is 'always assuming the worse interpretation' (1389b20).
26. By the comic poets Pl. means specifically the poets of Old Comedy, chief amongst them Aristophanes; in the *Comparison of Aristophanes and Menander*, Pl. faults him for malice (854A, 854D *bis*) and argues that he 'imitates towards the worse' (854D), just as H. here 'conjectures towards the worse'.
27. The war is the Peloponnesian War, the responsibility for which is almost always laid at Pericles' door; in T. Pericles is portrayed as saying that the Athenians must maintain their empire and not yield to the demands of the Spartans, but in the comic poets Aspasia, Pericles' concubine, and Pheidias, who was commissioned to make the chryselephantine statue of Athena for the Acropolis but was indicted for embezzlement (Philochorus, *FGrHist* 328 F 121), were both cited (how seriously we cannot tell) as the causes of the war: see Aristophanes, *Acharnians* 524–37 (itself possibly a parody of the opening of H.'s *Histories*) and *Peace* 605–14 (respectively).
28. Alexander ruled over Pherae in southern Thessaly and was assassinated by Thebe and her brothers *c.* 359: the earliest source is X. *Hellenica* 6.4.35–7; Pl. tells the story also at *Pelopidas* 28 and 35 and refers to it at *Moralia* 256A; cf. Diod. 16.14.
29. Cato the Younger, lionized by later generations as the indomitable defender of the Roman Republic, committed suicide after the

battle of Utica in 46 BCE when his and Brutus' forces were defeated by Caesar's. Pl. offers the opinion at *Cato the Younger* 72.3 that Caesar would have spared his life.

30. A number of sources refer to the use of bribery by Philip II (king of Macedon 359–336 and father of Alexander the Great); in one of the more famous, Philip is told that a town is impregnable and he then asks if even gold could not scale its walls (Diod. 16.54.3–4); see also *Moralia* 178A–B, *Aemilius Paullus* 12.10.
31. The debate about whether bravery or fortune was more responsible for Alexander the Great's success seems to have been a stock debating theme. Pl. himself touches on it in his *On the Fortune or Virtue of Alexander*.
32. Timotheus, an Athenian general active in the 370s and 360s, was extremely successful in winning cities over to Athens' side (see X. *Hellenica* 5.4.63–6, 6.2.11–13; Diod. 15.36.5–6). Eventually prosecuted for bribery or treason, he fled to Chalcis where he died in 355/4. Pl. tells the same story of him in *Moralia* 187B–C and at *Sulla* 6.3–4.
33. Pl. clearly has in mind here statements such as H. 7.152.3 (above, p. 9). The charge of 'servility' comes from the fact that a free man is expected to be able to speak freely (see Intro. §6), and the historian who behaves as Pl. describes is hiding behind someone else's account and failing to take responsibility for his statements.
34. Aristoxenus of Tarentum, born *c*. 376, was a pupil of Aristotle, and wrote works on musical theory (some of which survive). He also wrote on the philosophers Archytas, Socrates and Plato (highly critically of the latter two). See F. Wehrli, *Die Schule des Aristoteles V: Aristoxenos*, 2nd edn (Basel/Stuttgart, 1967). This particular passage is F 55.
35. Cf. *Moralia* 51C–D for similar sentiments about flatterers; in his essay *On Praising Oneself Inoffensively*, Pl. suggests that one should admit to minor faults in order to claim the larger virtues (543F–544B).
36. On the importance of the historian's disposition see also P. 12.24 and D.H. *Pomp.* 3.15 with the notes there.
37. Io was especially known from Aeschylus' *Suppliant Women* 291–324, where the story is told how Zeus mated with her, and Hera in jealousy turned her into a cow, and thereafter set a gadfly to drive her away; she eventually arrives in Egypt where she begets a son by Zeus, Epaphus. She is a character in *Prometheus Bound*, encountering the chained Prometheus as she makes her way to Egypt. The

Ionian Sea takes its name from her, and the Bosphorus ('Cow-ford') is said to commemorate her wanderings. Her son Epaphus was said to be the ancestor of both Aegyptus and Danaus, rulers of Egypt and Argos respectively. Further details in Gantz (1993) pp. 199–203; *LIMC* V.1.661–78.

38. In H. 1.1, the seizing of Io 'explains', according to the Persians, the reason for the conflict between Asia and Europe, and forms part of a demythologized version of earlier poetic and tragic accounts.

39. H. actually says that the Persians attribute this story to the Phoenicians (1.1.1). There is reason to doubt that H. is referring here to any genuine local tradition; his opening stories smack of Greek rationalization.

40. The notorious remark of H. occurs at 1.4.2 where he dismisses all such stories as explanatory for the later Greek/Persian conflict. Pl. realizes that if Io went willingly with the Phoenicians, then the Greeks have no moral justification for their retaliation, and this ultimately affects the Trojan War because Io's abduction is part of a series that culminates in the abduction of Helen, the usual cause given for the Trojan War.

41. The former story appears in X. *Hellenica* 6.4.7 and Pausanias 9.13. 5–6; Pl. tells it at 773B–774D; the latter story of the rape of Cassandra by Ajax son of Oileus (not the more famous Ajax son of Telamon) was told in the (now lost) epics on the sack of Troy: see Gantz (1993) pp. 650–55.

42. Aristomenes was a leader of the Messenians in their revolt against Sparta, possibly in the early seventh century BCE (though the traditions are confused and he may belong to a later time). Pl. wrote his biography, though it does not survive; his exploits, including his capture, are told by Pausanias 4.14.6–24.3 (possibly basing himself on Pl.'s lost work). Aristomenes is not mentioned by H., and this is an odd mistake for Pl. to make: on possible reasons see D. Ogden, *Aristomenes of Messene* (2004), who suggests that a Herodotean-style treatment of Aristomenes' exploits was in circulation and that this might be the cause of Pl.'s error. For the Achaean leader Philopoemen, see P. 10.21.2 with n. 101 (his last days are recounted at Pl.'s *Philopoemen* 18). For Regulus see P. 1.35.1–10.

43. In other words, the fact that one is captured is no indication of one's strength.

44. In the early Greek poetic tradition Busiris was a king of Egypt who sacrificed strangers who landed in Egypt, until Heracles arrived and killed him and his assistants (see *EGM* II.317–8). H. (2.45) ascribes the story to 'the Greeks', and rejects it as silly,

incompatible with actual Egyptian religious practices, and improbable; he does not mention Busiris by name, but the story was very well known.

45. H. 2.113–15 presents, as part of his rationalized version of the Trojan War, a series of events told to him by the Egyptian priests, in which Paris is blown off course to Egypt, and there his crime against his host, Menelaus, is revealed. The Egyptians are horrified and their king, Proteus, does not allow Paris to take Helen or the goods he took from Sparta to Troy, and they detain her in Egypt for the duration of the conflict, to be reclaimed by Menelaus after the war's end.
46. H. 2.119.2–3; as with the earlier parts of the story (see n. 45), H. ascribes the story to the Egyptian priests themselves.
47. There is no evidence that they were in fact honoured by the Egyptians.
48. H. makes the remark in the context of the Persians' openness to cultural borrowings (1.135). Pederastic relationships were common amongst the elite in classical Greece, and are known from all periods; heterosexual and homosexual love are both treated in Pl.'s *Erotikos*, with positive arguments made for both.
49. Pl.'s point here is not clear: he might be suggesting that castration would ruin the possibility of male love, or (conversely) that because the Persians castrated boys from the beginning, they were already aware of the erotic charms of beardless youths.
50. For these four religious items see (respectively) H. 2.4.2 and 58; 2.49.1; 2.171.2–3 and 2.61.1. The final quotation is at 2.171.1.
51. H. 2.43–4, 145–6.
52. H. 2.43, 145–6.
53. H. 2.44–5.
54. H. 2.46.1, 145.1.
55. H. 6.53–4. The Dorians claimed descent from the sons of Heracles.
56. H. 2.43–4.
57. Heracles was born in Thebes (and was thus Boeotian), while his maternal grandfather was Electryon, king of Mycenae in the Argolid (and was thus Argive).
58. On the term 'sophist' see above, n. 21; P. n. 135. The first list of the Seven Wise Men appears in Plato, *Protagoras* 343A, but the membership is not fixed: although Thales of Miletus, Solon of Athens, Pittacus of Mytilene and Bias of Priene are always included, the remaining three vary widely over more than a dozen names, including Pythagoras, Chilon of Sparta and Periander of Corinth (a

particular surprise in that H. at least portrays him as a violent tyrant). They all lived in the late seventh to early sixth century BCE.

59. H. 1.170.3; the tradition of his Phoenician origin (which may mean a descendant of those Phoenicians who came to Greece with Cadmus) was not unique to H. since his contemporary, the philosopher Democritus, also recorded it (*VS* 55 B 115).
60. The remark comes in a famous encounter between Solon and Croesus when Croesus asks Solon about prosperity and Solon warns that one's current lot is not necessarily permanent (1.32.1). The belief about the 'jealousy' of the gods is common in early Greek literature, but for Pl., who as a Platonist believed that only good things come from the gods, the sentiment was intolerable, and it is markedly absent in Pl.'s own version of the meeting (*Solon* 27).
61. Considered an 'elected tyrant' by Aristotle (*Politics* 1285a35–40), Pittacus ruled over Mytilene in the early sixth century BCE. He is the object of bitter attacks by the poet Alcaeus who claims he was destroying the city and its people. H. mentions a tradition that he visited Croesus' court (1.27.2, though this is chronologically unlikely) and dissuaded the king from mounting an expedition against the islands off the coast of Ionia.
62. Strabo 13.1.38 mentions that Pittacus was commander at this battle (*c.* 607/6) and tells the same story told by Pl. here. Pl.'s source for the story is unknown, but the battle (which was ultimately mediated by Periander) is likely to have been treated in the poems of Alcaeus: see D. L. Page, *Sappho and Alcaeus* (Oxford, 1955) pp. 152–61.
63. H. 5.94–5.
64. For these as signs of malice see chapters 3–4. For a similar complaint about focusing on bad deeds and overlooking good ones, see P. 12.15.11.
65. The Alcmaeonids were one of the most prominent clans at Athens, and the one to which Pericles belonged. Pl. takes up their story again at chapter 27 where he emphasizes their role as opponents of tyranny. Here he refers to the early incidents in H.'s narrative of Athenian history (1.59–61), where Athens is described as being beholden to three factions, two of which (led by Megacles the Alcmaeonid and Lycurgus) combined to drive out the tyrant Peisistratus. The two parties then fell out and Megacles made overtures to Peisistratus and promised to restore him on condition that he marry his daughter.
66. H. 1.61.2; the 'abnormal' way was perhaps designed to avoid pregnancy and in that sense could be taken to be an affront.

67. Thyrea was a source of conflict between Sparta and Argos for many years until they decided to have a battle in which each side had 300 selected warriors. At the end, only two Argives and Othryadas survived, but the two, assuming the victory by their numbers, left the battlefield, while Othryadas stayed and stripped the enemy dead (the usual indication of claiming victory). The next day a fresh dispute arose with new combatants and in this battle the Spartans were victorious. The story of Othryadas' suicide is mentioned at the end, possibly as a Spartan tradition (H. 1.82.8, where the quotation appears).
68. Croesus is so characterized presumably because he shows off his wealth to Solon and fails to understand Solon's warnings about prosperity (1.29–33). Upon his capture by Cyrus Croesus is indeed portrayed by H. as a 'wise adviser' (a common figure in H. whose advice is sound but ignored) to the king (1.88–91). Pl., however, accepts this role of Croesus' in *Solon* 28. The view of Cyrus as a great and wise monarch can be found in H., but Pl. has almost certainly been influenced by X.'s idealistic portrayal of him in his *Cyropaedia*.
69. On Croesus' gifts see H. 1.92, where he distinguishes the gifts Croesus sent to Delphi and the shrine of Amphiaraus (which were his own) from those to other shrines taken from the property of Pantaleon's supporter.
70. For the story of Deioces the Mede see H. 1.96–100.
71. Pl.'s summary here combines two passages, 1.143.3 and 1.146.2–3; H.'s claim that the Ionians are ashamed of the name probably dates from his own era when the Greeks of Asia Minor had a reputation for softness and servility. The notion that the Athenians and Ionians are connected is at least as old as Homer (*Iliad* 13.685–90).
72. Pactyes was entrusted by Cyrus with the task of conveying the Lydian booty to the Persian court, but he induced the Lydians to revolt, and then fled to Cyme where Pl. picks up the story; the lacuna in the text following 'the Cymaeans' makes it somewhat unclear: as H. tells it (1.153–60), the Persians demanded Pactyes from the Cymaeans, who sent him to Mytilene where the Mytileneans intended to hand him over; but the Cymaeans took him from there and brought him to Chios, where the Chians dragged him from the temple and surrendered him to the Persians; Pl.'s quotation is at 1.160.2. Atarneus was a fertile site on the island of Lesbos east of Mytilene. The 'pollution' referred to by Pl. would be the defilement of the temple arising from the forcible removal of the god's suppliants.
73. *FGrHist* 262 F 9; Charon (also cited below in chapter 24) wrote a work cited as *Chronicles of the Lampsacenes*. His date is uncertain

and it is not clear that he wrote before H., though he is almost certainly a contemporary; his plain style may have led Pl. and other critics to date him as an early writer: see D.H. *Thuc.* 5.2 with n. 17.

74. Polycrates, tyrant over Samos *c.* 540–522, is often portrayed as cunning and violent in the tradition. H. tells the story of his ring, which he flung away but which miraculously returned to him, as a warning of the dangers of prosperity. Initially supportive of Persia, his ambitions and naval power eventually brought him into conflict; lured into a trap by the Persian governor Oroetes, he was captured and crucified: see H. 3.41–3 (ring), 120–25 (capture and death).
75. H. 3.47.1; the war is probably the Second Messenian War in the mid seventh century BCE.
76. Amasis was king of Egypt *c.* 570–526; H. has many stories to tell of him (2.172–4).
77. Pl. tries to make his case by a piling-up of names. The Spartans had the reputation of being anti-tyrant in the decades leading up to Marathon (possibly because tyrants, like the Peisistratids at Athens, often supported Persia). It is not clear if Pl. is thinking of a single account where the Spartans' actions against tyrants were narrated or is merely saying that other writers have treated these expulsions in their separate works.
78. Alyattes, the penultimate king of the Lydian dynasty, reigned *c.* 610–560. Periander inherited the tyranny from his father Cypselus *c.* 625. The story of the boys is told at H. 3.48, where the action is explained as retaliation for the murder of Periander's son, Lycophron (3.49–53).
79. H. says only that the boys were taken by the Samians back home to Corcyra (3.48.4).
80. Antenor of Crete wrote a history of the island (date unknown), of which only this (*FGrHist* 463 F 2) and two other fragments survive; Dionysius of Chalcis wrote a work entitled *Foundations* in five books: testimonia and fragments at *FGrHist* 1773 (D. Engels); this fragment is F 9.
81. H. mentions Archias (whose grandson, also named Archias, he claims to have met and spoken with) at 3.55.
82. The story of the liberation of Athens from the tyrants is told at 5.62–5; Cleisthenes is mentioned as the one who bribed the priestess at 5.66.1. Themis is said by Aeschylus (*Eumenides* 1–6) to be the second to hold the seat at Delphi after Earth, her mother, and before Apollo. (Themis is also the personification of law or right action.)
83. For this technique as a sign of malice, see above, chapter 9.

84. H. 5.66. Isagoras, son of Tisander, is portrayed as Cleisthenes' opponent, who, when bested by Cleisthenes, appeals to the Spartans for their support; they come but meet resistance from the Athenians and eventually depart (5.66, 72). Caria was an area of south-west Asia Minor that, while Hellenized, was not quite Greek. The last sentence contains a pun on the phrases *eis Karakas* ('to the Carians') and *eis korakas* ('to the crows', often used in the sense of 'to hell').
85. H. 5.55, 57.1.
86. H. 5.90–91.1. Hippias, the deposed tyrant of Athens, had fled to Sigeum on the Scamander river: 5.68.3.
87. H. 5.92, the longest speech in H. and noteworthy for its extended narrative of Corinthian history under the tyrants.
88. For the story of the boys see above, n. 78. Pl.'s point seems to be that Socles' speech indicated an inconsistent character for the Corinthians since in his speech he finds fault with tyranny but the Corinthians themselves, in the incident of the boys, had shown great cruelty and support for the actions of the tyrant.
89. Pl. moves here to H.'s account of the Ionian Revolt (499–494 BCE); Sardis, the capital of Lydia, was a wealthy and important city in the Persian empire.
90. H. 5.97.3: 'these ships were the beginning of evils for Greeks and barbarians'; H.'s phrase (*archē kakōn*) is meant to recall Homer, *Iliad* 5.62, 11.604; and Pl. clearly caught the allusion since he actually uses the adjectival form *archēkakous* employed by Homer.
91. H. 5.99, 102.3.
92. Miletus, the 'ornament of Ionia', was a wealthy and powerful city at the mouth of the Maeander. Its recapture in 494 BCE and subsequent destruction at the hands of the Persians marked the end of the Ionian uprising against Persia.
93. *FGrHist* 426 F 1; once again Pl. uses a local history to correct and improve H. Nothing is known of Lysanias who is mentioned only here: see the discussion at *BNJ* 426 (C. J. Tuplin).
94. *FGrHist* 262 F 10; for Charon see above, n. 73 and D.H. *Thuc.* 5.2; for the Eretrians' defeat, H. 5.102.3.
95. H. 6.108.1–4, where the story is told to account for the Plataeans' presence in assisting Athens at Marathon. Plataea, while in Boeotian territory, refused to be part of the Boeotian alliance headed by Thebes, and this led to perpetual friction between Athens and Thebes.
96. Pl. seems to be reading ahead here, knowing, as he does, that the attack on Plataea by the Thebans was the opening event of the Peloponnesian War (T. 2.1).

97. It is not clear if by 'already convicted' Pl. is referring to a particular refutation of this incident by a predecessor.
98. H. 6.105–6 for the dispatch of Philippides to Sparta and the Spartans' reply.
99. The Attic month Boedromion, the second of the year, fell in late summer; the Athenians held a festival to Artemis on the sixth of this month, at which they commemorated Marathon (which Pl. mentions just below), and Pl. supposes this to have been the actual day of the battle. For the Spartans' viewing of the Persian corpses, H. 6.120.
100. H. 6.106.3.
101. Greek calendars were lunar, the middle of the month (i.e., the fourteenth) being the full moon; the Spartans thus could not have gone out until the fifteenth day of the month. But Pl. assumes, from the date of the festival (n. 99), that the Spartans would have arrived at Marathon around the tenth or so of the month, well before the full moon.
102. There is a gap in the text here: the supplement, by Pearson, would have Pl. echo H.'s own words about his purpose as they appear in the preface.
103. Again, Pl. assumes that the battle was on the sixth.
104. *FGrHist* 73 F 3. Diyllus wrote a history in twenty-six books, covering events from the outbreak of the Third Sacred War (357/6) to the death of Philip, son of Cassander, in 297/6. Diod. 16.76.6 says that he treated some of the same events as Ephorus and that his second part continued from where Ephorus left off. The total of ten talents, a sizeable fortune, is out of all proportion to similar grants and can hardly be genuine; the story arose in a different (later) milieu where historians began to be rewarded for their efforts in composing histories for individual cities: see chapter 31 below.
105. Again, it is not known to whom Pl. is referring here.
106. H. 6.117.1 records 192 Athenian, 6,400 Persian dead; the latter number became greatly magnified in the later tradition; the story of the 500 goats vowed to Artemis was already known to X. who mentions it in a speech to his troops (*Anabasis* 3.2.12).
107. H. 6.115–16.
108. For the use of harsh words as an indication of malice see above, chapter 2 (855B).
109. H. 6.113.1 says in fact that the battle lasted a long time, but Pl. is probably thinking of the general brevity of his account.
110. Pl. is probably thinking here of Theopompus whom he mentioned earlier (chapter 1) and who specifically criticized the Athenians for magnifying that nature of their struggle with the Persians: see, e.g.,

FGrHist 115 F 153: 'The Hellenic oath, which the Athenians say the Hellenes swore against the barbarians before the battle of Plataea, is falsified, as is the treaty of the Athenians with King Darius. Moreover, the battle of Marathon did not happen in the way that all celebrate it, and all the other things that the city of Athens brags about and uses to dupe the Hellenes.'

111. In *Aristides* 5.5 Pl. has the Persians after the battle blown by the winds 'inwards, towards Attica'; he clearly is using a different tradition here which has them blown far away from Attica.
112. H.'s exoneration of the Alcmaeonids is part of a long digression at 6.121–31 after his narrative of the battle; the claim quoted by Pl. is 6.124.2.
113. H. 6.121.1; the 'little crab' perhaps derives from a fable of a crab and snake: see E. Diehl, ed., *Anthologia Lyrica Graeca*, vol. 2 (Leipzig, 1964) p. 184.
114. For this technique as a sign of malice, see chapter 8.
115. The quotation is at 6.121.1; the alliance: 1.60.2–61.2, and above, chapter 16.
116. H. mentions these three at 6.121.1, but he does not mention their wealth; the assertion that H. wished to curry favour with Hipponicus is Pl.'s own inference.
117. H.'s story of the Greeks' attempt to enlist Argive assistance is at 7.148–52.
118. For malice as putting a sinister cast on matters that cannot be denied, see chapter 6.
119. The quotations are from (respectively) H. 7.150.3, 7.151, 7.152.2–3; for the technique see H. n. 18.
120. At 3.20–22 the Persian king Cambyses sends gifts to the Ethiopians; the Ethiopian king, suspecting that the Persians were spies, refutes Cambyses for the deceptiveness of the clothing (because it had been dyed and was thus 'false') and the perfume (because it masked a real odour with a false one).
121. The quotation is from Euripides, *Andromache* 448.
122. See chapter 8 for this technique as a sign of malice.
123. On Heracles as Argive, above, chapter 14.
124. The Siphnians and Cythnians are both attested as having fought against the Persians but they were tiny towns, the former providing but one (8.48), the latter two (8.46.4) ships for the Greek fleet.
125. For Laconia, above, P. n. 255; for Thyrea, above n. 67.
126. H. (9.12) has the Argives tell the Persians that they were unable to keep the Spartans from marching out, but he does not detail any effort by them to do so.

127. Pl. here takes on one of the most famous passages in H., his lengthy argument (7.139) that the Athenians were most responsible for the Greek victory over the Persians; the phrase 'saviours of Greece' occurs at 7.139.5.
128. See below, chapters 31, 33, 35 for Pl.'s attack on H.'s portrayal of the Thebans and Phocaeans.
129. H. uses a series of counterfactuals to argue that the other Greeks could not have withstood Persian power without the Athenians (7.139.2–4), and it is this 'imaginary' history that Pl. attacks.
130. Pl.'s point being, of course, that since the Spartans fought to the last man at Thermopylae, they would have done likewise in any other battle.
131. H. 7.190. Pl. suggests that the comment was gratuitous and thus indicative of malice (see chapter 3 where the introduction of an irrelevant misfortune is specifically mentioned).
132. *FGrHist* 379 F 5. Aristophanes wrote *Theban Chronicles* (possibly called *Boeotian Matters*) but little is known of him; of the nine fragments that survive Pl. cites two (here and in chapter 33); he probably wrote in the late fifth/early fourth century BCE (so Jacoby ad loc.; further discussion at *BNJ* 379 (A. Schachter)). Again, the demand for money (above, n. 104) suggests a much later milieu than H.'s.
133. Cf. above, chapter 1, for Pl.'s claim that a defence of the Boeotians was an important part of his essay. The suggestion that H. 'hated' the Boeotians would indicate an inappropriately biased approach to the writing of history: Intro. §6.
134. An amalgamation of 7.172.1 and 7.139.3.
135. Tempe was the first place the Greeks determined to make their stand against Persian land forces but they withdrew when informed of an alternative path (7.173.4, offered as H.'s opinion). H. mentions the total forces sent to Tempe as 10,000 (7.173.2) but says nothing of the Theban contingent in particular, nor does he name their commander Mnamias; Pl. must have got this information elsewhere.
136. Pl. presumably here is referring to the Greek decision to abandon the mainland and entrust their fortunes to their navy. He writes as if the Thebans decided to medize only when the rest of the Greeks took to their ships, while in H. the decision to take to the ships is in part because the Thebans and others had medized (see 8.34.1 where the Boeotians are described as already having medized when Xerxes enters their territory). Guest-friendship (*xenia*) was a reciprocal relationship whereby men offered hospitality to those visiting

from different countries and served as their sponsors and protectors when their guest-friends visited.

137. Pl. had just attacked him for saying so: see chapter 29 (865A) above.
138. See above, chapter 6, for this technique as an indication of malice.
139. H. 7.222.
140. H. 7.220.2 and 7.222.
141. H. 7.220.4.
142. Given that the dream foretells the later rise and swift fall of the Theban hegemony (371–362 BCE), it must come from a time after those events, and is thus, of course, post-Herodotean. (It presents no problem for Pl. because he believes in prophetic dreams.)
143. H. 7.225.2–3.
144. This story is recorded by Diod. (11.9.4–10.4) and Justin (2.11.5–18); it may go back to Ephorus.
145. If Pl. wrote this life it does not survive; there is a collection of sayings of Leonidas at *Moralia* 225A–E; some of the remarks here are also found there.
146. There is a gap in the text here and the word 'matters' must follow from what has gone before. No suitable supplement has been suggested. At *Moralia* 225E, Leonidas tries to save three men, the second of whom replies, 'I would be a better man if I remained here', but it is not certain that this is any help for the present passage.
147. The celebration of the funeral games while still at Sparta must belong to the tradition (again, post-Herodotean) that the Spartans (or at least Leonidas) knew that they were going to certain death. As to the two Spartans Leonidas tried to dismiss, H. mentions alternative traditions about two Spartans at Thermopylae (7.229–32), one of whom is sent as a messenger, but those have little in common with Pl.'s account here.
148. H. 2.162.3, 2.121δ.
149. H. 7.233.1 for the Thebans fighting under compulsion; the whips refer to the method used by Xerxes' commanders for driving the Persian allies forward against the Spartans (7.223.3).
150. H. 7.233.1–2.
151. H. does not mention this battle but Pl. mentions it at *Camillus* 19.4, where it is dated 'more than 200 years before Leuctra', i.e., before 571, and so hardly 'until recently'.
152. H. 7.233.2.
153. The son of Leontiades, Eurymachus, played a role in the Theban attack on Plataea that opened the Peloponnesian War (T. 2.2.3), and it has been suggested that contemporary hostility against the son resulted in the accusation of medism against the father.

154. *FGrHist* 379 F 6: for Aristophanes see above, n. 132; *FGrHist* 271–2 F 35: Nicander was active in the late third/early second century BCE and was honoured by the Delphians for composing a song for them (*SIG*[3] 452, dated between 225 and 210 BCE); a number of historical works are attributed to him: see *BNJ* 379 (F. Jenkins).
155. For Xerxes' mutilation of Leonidas' corpse, H. 7.238, which H. sees as the greatest evidence that Xerxes hated Leonidas more than all others. Pl. is trying to suggest that the branding of Leontiades was a similar action from a similar motive.
156. H. 6.129.4; Hippocleides was a guest at the home of Cleisthenes of Sicyon who was holding a contest for his daughter's hand. Hippocleides was the leading candidate until one evening he got carried away and began to dance on the table; Cleisthenes in anger told him he had 'danced his marriage away' to which Hippocleides gave the response, 'Hippocleides doesn't care!'
157. For Pindar see D.H n. 177; this is F 77 Snell, quoted several other times by Pl. In another fragment Pindar refers to Athens as the 'bulwark of Hellas' (F 76), but his attitude towards the Persian Wars is not easy to discern.
158. Artemisium takes its name from a temple of Artemis (Artemis Prosēoa, i.e., 'facing east') on the north-west corner of the island of Euboea. The Greek navy had been sent there as part of the advance strategy, which included Thermopylae (the 'Gates' referred to here): H. 7.175–7.
159. H. 8.18. For the use of harsher terms when milder ones are available as an indication of malice, see chapter 2; the objection here may seem overdone, but it is an essential part of Pl.'s characterization of H.
160. H. 8.23.1.
161. On the temple of Artemis 'Facing East', see above, n. 158.
162. *FGE* XXIV; the lines are also quoted at *Themistocles* 8.4. If the poem really did refer to the battle of Artemisium, the phrase 'destroyed the army of the Medes' would seem exaggerated, since the Persian navy was far from through.
163. H. 8.21.2.
164. Thurii was a pan-Hellenic colony in Italy founded in 443 under the leadership of Athens (Diod. 11.90.3–4), and there was an ancient tradition that H. joined this (Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 3.9.2 says that H.'s work began 'H. of Thurii', although our manuscripts begin 'H. of Halicarnassus'); Pl. discussed the question in his *On Exile* (604F). Pl. rejects Thurii here so that he can sneer at the Halicarnassians; it is not clear why he thought H. 'protective' of them: perhaps

because of the role that H. assigns to Artemisia (see below, n. 181; whence also the references to 'harem'). On the Halicarnassians as Dorian see H. 7.99.3.

165. H. 8.30.1–2.
166. H. 8.32–3, where twelve, not thirteen, cities are named.
167. For the suggestion of bad motives as a mark of malice, see chapter 6.
168. When the Greeks formed their alliance against the Persians, a major condition was to end any fighting between members of the confederacy (H. 7.145.1), the chief offenders being Athens and Aegina; H. does not mention reconciliation between Chalcis and Eretria (though the two had been inveterate enemies) or Corinth and Megara (who often clashed over the land on the borders).
169. Nothing is known of Lacrates; he is unlikely to be a historian and Pl.'s words make it sound more as if he gave some kind of oral testimony after the Persians' retreat.
170. H. does not list the Phocians when he gives the Greek battle order (9.28.2–6); he does mention 1,000 Phocians serving for Persia where he also notes that not all had medized and some Phocians were making raids from Parnassus on the Persian army (9.31.5).
171. H. says that Naxos sent four ships (8.46.3).
172. *FGrHist* 4 F 183 and 70 F 187. For Hellanicus see D.H. *Thuc.* 5.2 with n. 18; for Ephorus see above, p. 25.
173. The gap in the text has not been plausibly emended.
174. H. 6.96. Pl. is again being sarcastic.
175. For silence about noble actions as a marker of malice, see chapter 4.
176. *FGE* XIX; cf. Page's comment ad loc.: 'probably a short piece designed for recitation at symposia'. Simonides of Ceos was the most famous poet of his time, being renowned already in the late sixth century BCE, and becoming known eventually as the great poet of the Persian Wars. None of his poems survives entire, but he was proficient at virtually every genre of poetry, and in some traditions he was seen as a wisdom figure.
177. The Aeginetans and Athenians claimed first and second place: see H. 8.84.
178. For Themistocles see Cic. *Letters to Friends* 5.12.5 with n. 12. H. does not mention Themistocles' erection of a temple to Artemis: see Pl. *Themistocles* 22.2; Themistocles had his house at Melite, which lay west of the Athenian agora.
179. The passages are (respectively) H. 8.57.1–2, 8.57.2, 8.58.1, 8.58.2. The belief that Themistocles was the architect of the winning naval

strategy is everywhere in the tradition, appearing already in the speech that T. gives the Athenians at Sparta when they are defending themselves (1.72–78). Mnesiphilus was prominent enough to have been a candidate for ostracism, but only H. gives him the credit for this strategy. Pl. in *Themistocles* 2.6 has Mnesiphilus as an early and influential teacher of Themistocles, a way of both maintaining his presence in the tradition as known from H. and not taking any credit away from Themistocles for his winning strategy. See further Pelling, 'De Malignitate Plutarchi' (n. 1) 158–9.

180. Although even in H. Themistocles shows Odyssean cunning, no one other than Pl. says that he had this nickname, nor does Pl. use it in his own *Themistocles*.

181. H. 8.68β–γ. Artemisia took over the rule of Halicarnassus after the death of her husband Mausolus. H. clearly found her a fascinating figure, not least because she was a woman fighting against men; she here plays a role common in H.'s work, that of the 'wise adviser' (above, n. 68).

182. Sibyls were inspired female seers who usually gave their prophecies in verse; they were not associated with oracles (as was, for example, the Pythia at Delphi) and were of indeterminate number, although the most famous ones were at Erythrae and Cumae. Xerxes hands over his children to Artemisia to escort back to Susa after his defeat at Salamis (H. 8.103).

183. H. 8.94.2–3.

184. For the tragic crane see P. 3.48.8–9 with n. 59; for the stage as a locus for improbabilities and falsehoods, see Intro. §9.

185. H. 8.94.4; it is often pointed out in H.'s defence that he gives this only as an Athenian version; but Pl. will have recognized that H. tacitly accepted the Athenian account since in his narrative of the battle H. gives the Corinthians no actual role.

186. T. 1.73.2–74.4; an argument from silence, of course, but given Athenian hatred for Corinth in these years, it's hard to imagine they would not have brought up so powerful a charge if it were to hand.

187. H. 9.81 says that the Greeks, after their final victory at Plataea, made dedications to Apollo, Zeus and Poseidon; the one to Apollo was a golden tripod atop a bronze column in the shape of a three-headed snake. The tripod was melted down by the Phocians in the fourth century (Pausanias 10.13.9) but the column (called the 'Serpent Column') survived and was eventually taken by Constantine to Constantinople and placed in the Hippodrome (where a part of it survives to this day). On this monument the Corinthians do

indeed come third, after the Lacedaemonians and the Athenians: see C. W. Fornara, *Archaic Times to the End of the Peloponnesian War*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, 1983), no. 59, coil 2.

188. *FGE* XI; the first two lines partly survive on stone: *Inscriptiones Graecae*, vol. 1, 3rd edn (Berlin, 1981), no. 1143; at least one source attributes it to Simonides.

189. *FGE* XII; further lines of this are quoted by Aelius Aristides and the Palatine Anthology: see Page ad loc., who points out that the verb *keimetha* ('lie dead') seems inappropriate for a cenotaph.

190. *FGE* XIII.

191. *FGE* X; the ascription to Simonides is 'not to be taken seriously' (Page ad loc.).

192. It was not uncommon for the Greek elite to name their children so as to commemorate their own achievements. The children's names mean (respectively) 'victory with ships', 'best of the spoils', 'averter of violence' and 'champion'.

193. See above, n. 84 for Caria.

194. See Pausanias 2.5.1 for the temple, which was dedicated on the citadel to the 'armed' Aphrodite. The story of Jason's love for Thetis is not directly attested elsewhere.

195. *FGE* XIV. Cypris is an alternative name for Aphrodite. The lines are also quoted by Theopompus (*FGrHist* 115 F 285), Timaeus (556 F 10), Athenaeus 13.32, 573C–E and the scholion to Pindar, *Olympian Odes* 13.32; see the full discussion at *FGE* 207–10, where Page concludes that Theopompus' version is probably the correct one and that the verses accompanied a painting, not a statue.

196. See above, chapter 30; and for omission of noble actions as an indicator of malice, chapter 4.

197. H. 8.112.

198. H. 8.122. H. notes (8.93.1) that the Aeginetans were regarded as the best fighters at Salamis and the Athenians were second. Apollo's demand in H. is ambiguous: either he means he wants a dedication commensurate with the Aeginetans' having fought best overall or he wants the Aeginetans to award their prize of valour to him. H. says that in response to the god's demand they dedicated three gold stars on a bronze mast (8.122).

199. Pl. has not previously mentioned the Scythians (a nomadic people who resided in what is now Ukraine and southern Russia), even though H. devoted more than half a book to them (4.1–142) and to Darius' ultimately unsuccessful attempt to conquer them.

200. Aesop, probably from the early sixth century BCE, was famous for his animal stories and is often mentioned by Pl. The point here is

that H.'s speeches have as much truth value as speeches assigned to animals.

201. Pl. here follows the tradition largely developed by the Athenians themselves, that they were the ones most responsible for the victory at Salamis; the viewpoint is pervasive especially in Athenian oratory of the fourth century BCE (see M. Nouhaud, *L'utilisation de l'histoire par les orateurs attiques* (Paris, 1982) pp. 155–61), which Pl. knew well.

202. H. 8.123.

203. A rather surprising remark from Pl. here, given that he has been criticizing H. throughout for being such a fault-finder.

204. H. 8.124.1.

205. H. 8.144 (Spartan fear concerning Athens); 9.6–9 (Spartan delay).

206. H. 9.9; for guest-friendship see above, n. 136.

207. Cf. chapter 37 for Pl.'s objections to H.'s portrayal of Mnesiphilus who likewise communicated essential strategy; as in that previous passage, the introduction of an external adviser robs the main characters of the renown that ought to be theirs.

208. H. 9.26–7 has the Tegeans and the Athenians rehearse their great deeds before the Spartans as a way of determining who would hold the left wing (the right always being held by the Spartans); the Athenians mention several deeds from their past, including Marathon, after which the Spartans award them command of the wing (9.26–7).

209. H. 9.46, one of the oddest incidents in H.'s account of Plataea, the more so in that it comes to nothing, for the Persians, seeing the switch, then switch their own lines, after which the Greeks go back to their original formation. Pl. treats the incident in *Aristides* 12.

210. H. 9.52; the Heraion is the temple of Hera; scholars have assumed that some tactical manoeuvre, misunderstood by H., lies behind this, but H.'s account of the fighting at Plataea, as is usual in his battle narratives, focuses on just a very few cities.

211. H. 9.59.1, 9.67.

212. H. 9.69.2 for the Phleiasians and Megarians, 9.69.1 for the Corinthians.

213. H. 9.68 for the Boeotian (not only Theban) cavalry; see above, chapter 33 (866F and 867B) for the branding of the Thebans.

214. *IEG*[2] FF 15–16; the lines are often printed as a single six-line unit, but it is clear that the last three lines are part of a separate poem, and I have translated them as they are presented in *IEG*[2]. Ephyra is mentioned by Homer as a city in Argos (*Iliad* 6.152) and is later equated with Corinth. Glaucus, son of Sisyphus and Merope, was king in Corinth.

215. The 'gold honoured on high' is the sun.
216. Pl. clarifies this in this way because if Simonides had written it for a chorus or as a hymn, it would have had a largely panegyrical tone, and could thus be judged as not wholly trustworthy; so he suggests that Simonides wrote it in the more straightforward language of a simple account, an argument he can make because the lines are not written in a hymnic metre.
217. See Pl., *Aristides* 21.2–3, Pausanias 9.2.6 and Strabo 9.2.31 for the ceremonies still celebrated at Plataea in Pl.'s own day; given that Plataea had been destroyed more than once between the Persian Wars and Pl.'s own time, it is unlikely that the celebrations that Pl. knew were part of an unbroken chain going back to the fifth century BCE.
218. H. 9.85.3.
219. The Serpent Column (n. 187), where the Aeginetans appear on coil 3.
220. H. 9.85.3.
221. For the Athenians and Spartans nearly coming to blows (not in H.) see *Aristides* 20.1–4.
222. *FGE* XV; the three lines appear also in Pl. *Aristides* 19.7; *Palatine Anthology* 6.50 (ascribing the poem to Simonides) has an additional verse between Pl.'s first and third ('trusting to the daring strength of their spirit'), but this is not likely to be part of the original: see *FGE* pp. 211–12. On the altar to Zeus Eleutherios ('Zeus of freedom'), see Pausanias 9.2.5.
223. *FGE* XVII(a); the story is told at greater length by T. 1.132, who states that the inscription was on the 'tripod' (see above, n. 187) and that, as Pl. says in the next sentence, the Spartans had these offensive lines immediately erased and replaced with the names of all the cities that had jointly fought and defeated the barbarians. On Pausanias' actions after the war, see above, n. 24.
224. Sochares is probably the Sophanes of H. 9.73.1 (called Sochares also in Pl.'s *Cato the Elder* 29.2); for Aeimnestus see H. 9.64.2.
225. On the Cythnians see above, n. 124; the Melians provided two ships at Salamis: H. 8.48; for their names on the monument see coils 10 and 7 (respectively).
226. In beginning his summation Pl. now mentions his previous complaints; for the incidents he refers to here see: H. 8.18 (Artemisium); 7.206 (Thermopylae); 8.68–9, 87–8, 93, 101–103 (Artemisia); 9.69–70.1 (Plataea).
227. A 300-line 'battle of frogs and mice' survives attributed to Homer, although this can hardly be accepted. The Byzantine lexicon

known as the Suda says Pigres was Artemisia's brother (though neither son nor brother is likely), and the work is also ascribed to a Tigres.

228. H. 9.62.3 and 9.63.2; this is a new point not previously made by Pl.
229. H. does not say they were 'unarmed', though the phrase could be read that way; but it is clear that he means without the heavy protective armour of the hoplite.
230. Pl. alludes here to and alters *Odyssey* 11.368 where Alcinous compliments his guest, Odysseus: 'you have recounted the tale knowledgeably, like a poet'; although the remark 'like a poet' in Homer has a positive sense, Pl. here follows Plato in believing that poetry is marked by its agreeable nature, but that poets themselves tell many falsehoods.
231. Pl. has to identify Julius Caesar in this way since many of the emperors were also called 'Caesar'.
232. For another remark comparing history and biography see P. 10.21. 2–8.
233. This is the dedicatee of Pl.'s *Parallel Lives*.
234. This is P.'s 'pragmatic' history: 9.1.4 with n. 98.
235. For the treatment of mythical material in history see Intro. §9.
236. Lycurgus was the (almost certainly legendary) early lawgiver of Sparta. Numa was Rome's second king, Romulus its first. Theseus, though here called the 'founder', was not (even in legend) Athens' founder in the way that Romulus was for Rome; rather he was credited by the Athenians with unifying Attica, a move that signalled the first steps in Athens' rise to greatness. See T. 2.15.
237. *Seven Against Thebes* 435, 395–6.
238. For other remarks 'excusing' incursions into early history see Diod. 4.1.1–4 and Livy, *preface* 6–7 (which suggests a similar indulgence for early accounts).
239. Pl. has been discussing rumours against Pericles, including that he had relations with his son's wife.
240. A writer of the fifth century BCE whose works are lost to us; he wrote a political pamphlet on some of the politicians of his time, including Themistocles, Pericles and Thucydides, son of Melesias (not the historian). Testimonia and fragments at *FGrHist* 107 and, with English translation and updated bibliography, at *BNJ* 107 (S. Dmitriev).
241. On flattery and hostility see Intro. §6.
242. In this essay, also known as *Were the Athenians More Renowned in War or Wisdom?*, Pl. argues that doers of deeds are always the most important members of the community and that it was they

who made Athens great. We pick up his argument here (the beginning of the treatise is lost) at a point where he is saying that without great deeds there are no historians. For the notion of the historian's glory being dependent on his subject see Callisthenes, T 8 with n. 2 and Intro. §2.

243. The references to T.'s work are (respectively): 2.65, 2.86–92, 4.53–7, 3.51, 4.42–5, 4.3–16, 4.30–39, and 1.108.

244. On Cratippus (whose work does not survive), see D.H. *Thuc.* 16.2. Some of these events are known from other historians.

245. This is an unusual phrase; Pl. seems to suggest that the historian and his theme became one.

246. On X. see above, p. 23. In the *Hellenica* (3.1.2) X. says that a certain Themistogenes of Syracuse has written up an account of the retreat of the 10,000 after the battle of Cunaxa, an obvious reference to X.'s own *Anabasis*. Though scholars have argued on both sides, the general consensus today is that expressed here by Pl., namely that X. used a pseudonym, though not all agree with Pl.'s reasons for why X. did so.

247. The first three are all Athenian historians (*FGrHist* 323, 73 and 328, respectively), chosen no doubt not because they were famous but because they were Athenian; on Phylarchus, see P. 2.56.

248. See Sallust, *Catiline* 3.2 for a different reflection on the historian's renown. For the historian as mirror, L. *Hist.* 51.

249. On Simonides see n. 176.

250. Cf. D.H. *Rom. Ant.* 11.1.3; on vividness, Intro. §12.

251. These events are narrated at T. 4.9–12; for the paradox of the reversal of Athenian and Spartan roles see 4.12.3.

252. The full quotation of this passage (there are gaps here in the manuscripts of Pl.) can be found at D.H. *Thuc.* 26.2.

253. The text here is very uncertain.

29. TACITUS

1. For Tacitus' life and times, R. Syme, *Tacitus*, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1958), is exhaustive and somewhat overwhelming; more readable are R. H. Martin, *Tacitus* (London and Berkeley, 1981; rev. edn, Bristol, 1994) and R. Ash, *Tacitus* (London, 2006). For Tacitus' methods and notions of history see B. Walker, *The Annals of Tacitus* (Manchester, 1962); Leeman (1963) pp. 337–60; J. Ginsburg, *Tradition and Theme in the Annals of Tacitus* (New York, 1981); R. Mellor, *Tacitus* (London and New York, 1993); *LatHist*

pp. 88–118; R. Ash, *Ordering Anarchy: Armies and Leaders in Tacitus' Histories* (London and New York, 1999); Duff (2003) pp. 93–101; E. C. O'Gorman, *Irony and Misreading in the Annals of Tacitus* (Cambridge, 2000); and H. Haynes, *The History of Make-Believe: Tacitus on Imperial Rome* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 2003). Three excellent collections of essays are: T. J. Luce and A. J. Woodman, *Tacitus and the Tacitean Tradition* (Princeton, 1993); A. J. Woodman, ed., *Cambridge Companion to Tacitus* (Cambridge, 2009); and R. Ash, ed., *Tacitus* (Oxford Readings in Classical Studies, Oxford, 2012).

2. The year is 69 CE.
3. Actium, where Octavian (the future Augustus) defeated Antony and Cleopatra, was fought in 31 BCE and marked the end of nearly a century of civil war; over the next decades Octavian consolidated his power to become the 'first citizen' (*princeps*) of Rome.
4. Tacitus is most probably referring here to republican historians, ending with Livy.
5. For the importance of political experience see P. 12.25d–28a; cf. Dio 53.19.2–3.
6. This must refer to the writers of the early empire, though it is difficult to tell which ones specifically Tacitus has in mind.
7. For the dangers of flattery and hostility, Intro. §6.
8. These three were all short-lived emperors in the year of civil war (68–69 CE) which followed on the death of Nero, the last of the Julio-Claudians.
9. The Flavian emperors ruled (respectively) 69–79 CE, 79–81, 81–96.
10. Nerva ruled 96–8, Trajan, 98–117. Tacitus seems never to have written such a history, since in his next work, the *Annals*, he went further back in time to the Julio-Claudians, beginning with Tiberius.
11. Richer perhaps because of Trajan's conquests (cf. *Annals* 4.32.1–2) and safer because of the tolerance of free speech shown by Nerva and Trajan.
12. The opening of the *Annals* moves from the original sole power of the kings of Rome through the divided powers of the consuls and other magistrates of the Republic to the return of sole power under Augustus.
13. For these offices, see Livy, 6.1.1 with n. 24.
14. A reference to the troubles of the 80s BCE. Lucius Cornelius Cinna marched with Marius on Rome in 87, and both men followed with a purge of their political enemies; Cinna was again consul in 85 and

84, intending to fight a civil war with Sulla but before he could do so, his army mutinied and killed him. Lucius Cornelius Sulla on his return from the east defeated Cinna's partisans and had himself appointed dictator in 81, after which he engaged in the proscriptions, the murder of his political opponents and confiscation of their property. Having passed a legislative programme in 81 and 80, he retired from the dictatorship and wrote his memoirs (the fragments of which are at *FRHist* 22).

15. References to the (unofficial) First and (official) Second Triumvirates: in 60 BCE, Caesar, Pompey and Crassus formed an unofficial alliance to advance each of their interests; the alliance was under repeated strain, and eventually Caesar and Pompey fought against each other, Pompey's decisive defeat coming at Pharsalus in 48. Antony, Lepidus and Augustus were officially proclaimed 'triumvirs for the restoration of the republic' in 43 BCE; like Sulla, they engaged in proscriptions; the growing dissension between the two leading men, Antony and Augustus, was only resolved at Actium (n. 3).
16. This offers a slight contradiction with what Tacitus said in the earlier *Histories* (1.1.1). Cf. Josephus, *Jewish Antiquities* 20. 154–7.
17. For the importance of impartiality, see Intro. §6.
18. For this passage see the important discussions of T. J. Luce, 'Tacitus on "History's Highest Function": *praecipuum munus annalium* (*Annals* 3.65)', *ANRW* II.33.4 (1991) pp. 2904–27, and A. J. Woodman, '*Praecipuum Munus Annalium*: The Construction, Convention and Context of *Annals* 3.65.1', in id., *Tacitus Reviewed* (Oxford, 1998) pp. 86–103. I follow the latter's interpretation of the parenthesis; in the more usual translation, Tacitus is seen as saying that he has recorded certain senatorial opinions *because* he thinks that history's greatest function is not to pass over noble actions and to ensure that debased words and actions may have the fear of posterity.
19. For history's protreptic function in both virtue and vice see Diod. 1.1.5; 15.1.1.
20. This is one of the most commented upon sections of Tacitus' work, important for his understanding of the historian's role and his own history. For discussion see: H. Cancik-Lindemaier and H. Cancik, 'Zensur und Gedächtnis: zu Tacitus, Annales IV.32–8', *Der altsprachliche Unterricht* 29.4 (1986) pp. 16–35; *RICH* 180–86; R. Martin and A. J. Woodman, *Tacitus: Annals IV* (Cambridge, 1989) pp. 169–84; J. L. Moles, 'Cry Freedom: Tacitus, *Annals* 4. 32–35', *Histos* 2 (1998) pp. 95–184.

21. For history as the record of 'great' events see Intro. §2; Tacitus' remark here stands in strong contrast to the usual claims made by historians of the greatness of their events, but as the passage continues it is clear that he believes he has chosen the right approach to the very different possibilities afforded by imperial history.
22. Tiberius (14–37 CE), who followed the directives that Augustus left at his death that the empire's boundaries not be extended.
23. Tacitus here defends the inclusion of 'small' matters because, he argues, they have an effect on 'great' ones and are thus instructive to the reader.
24. There are allusions here to P.'s famous discussion of the Roman constitution as 'mixed' (6.3–10) and Cic.'s implicit rejection of it at *On the Republic* 1.53–4.
25. For an alternative approach to the challenges offered by an autocratic government see Dio 53.19.
26. See P. 1.35 and Diod. 1.1.1–5 for the vicarious experience afforded by history.
27. On the dichotomy between pleasure and utility see Intro. §7.
28. Cf. below, *Annals* 6.7.5 and 16.16.1–2.
29. It had been common from the early days of the Republic to infer contemporary references from remarks made by characters on stage, but the issue took a much more serious turn under the empire, where caution was constantly needed lest offence be given. In Tacitus' *Dialogue on Orators*, one of the characters, Curiatius Maternus, had given offence during the recitation of his *Cato* (presumably Cato the Younger, the opponent of Julius Caesar) because he was thought to be covertly criticizing the ruling regime: see *Dialogue* 2.1 with R. Mayer, *Dialogus de Oratoribus* (Cambridge, 2001) pp. 91–3 and, more generally, F. Ahl, 'The Art of Safe Criticism in Greece and Rome', *AJPh* 105 (1984) pp. 174–208.
30. The year is 25 CE; for the 'new crime' cf. Seneca the Elder, *Controversiae* 10, preface 5 on Titus Labienus.
31. Well into the early empire, Caesar's assassins, Marcus Junius Brutus and Gaius Cassius Longinus, continued to be invoked as figures of resistance to monarchical power: see E. Rawson, 'Cassius and Brutus: the Memory of the Liberators', in ead., *Roman Culture and Society* (Oxford, 1991) pp. 488–507.
32. Lucius Aelius Sejanus, the prefect of the Praetorian Guard, had risen to power during Tiberius' absence from Rome, during which he ruled virtually unopposed; he was eventually charged with treason and executed in 31 CE.
33. See above at the Elder Seneca, *Controversiae* 10, preface 5 with n. 8.

34. Quintus Caecilius Metellus Pius Scipio and Lucius Afranius were partisans of Pompey who died when the latter was defeated by Julius Caesar at the battle of Pharsalus in 49 BCE. For Cassius and Brutus, above, n. 31.
35. Asinius Pollio, a supporter of Caesar and then Antony, is perhaps best known as the patron of Virgil; orator and poet, he also wrote *Histories*, beginning with the year 60 (the work is referred to in a famous poem of Horace's, *Odes* 2.1) and going down to at least 42 and possibly beyond; he was especially famous for his independence: testimonia and fragments at *FRHist* 56; discussion at *FRHist* vol. 1 pp. 435–45 (A. Drummond). Messala Corvinus was originally a supporter of Brutus and Cassius but later supported Augustus; little is known of his history: testimonium and fragments at *FRHist* 61 (A. Drummond).
36. In response to Cic.'s *Cato* Caesar wrote an *Anticato*.
37. Neither the letters of Antony nor the speeches of Brutus survive.
38. Marcus Furius Bibaculus wrote an epic poem, *Annals of the Gallic War*, in at least eleven books, where (presumably) his insults of Caesar were to be found; for the fragments see *FLP* pp. 192–200; for Catullus' invectives against Caesar see poems 29, 54, 57 and 93.
39. Cf. Quintilian 10.1.34 with n. 11.
40. The 'images' referred to here are their ancestral masks: see Sallust, *Jugurtha* 4.5 with n. 12.
41. Though with some parts lost: see Quintilian, *Orator's Training* 10.1.104.
42. The context for this remark is a series of attacks on various members of the Senate in 32 CE; what follows as an example of what was unrecorded but worthy to be known is an exceptionally brave and straightforward speech by Marcus Terentius (6.8.1–6).
43. For this notion as important to the subject matter of history, Intro. §2.
44. This remark comes after Tacitus' narration of Antistius Sosianus' false charges against Publius Anteius and Ostorius Scapula, both of whom committed suicide before they could be condemned. The year is 66 CE.
45. The passage is difficult to interpret. An alternate reading is 'I hate'; those who adopt this reading see it either as an expression of impartiality by Tacitus (so E. Koestermann, *Cornelius Tacitus: Annalen*, vol. 4 (Heidelberg, 1968) p. 366) or as a defence offered by Tacitus for describing each death individually (so A. J. Woodman, *Tacitus: The Annals* (Indianapolis, 2004) p. 347 n. 39.